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Shipping Regulation and the Federal
Maritime Commission
PART I
James S. Gordont
Recent years have witnessed a remarkable burst of Federal Maritime
Commission activity, spurred largely by congressional pressures upon
the Commission.' Since its creation and investiture in late 1961, the
pace of Commission activity has totally eclipsed that of its predeces-
sor agencies during the 45 years of their existence.2
The Commission's zeal has imposed significant burdens and costs
both on the Government and the industry. Its "fact-finding investi-
gations" and hearings into steamship conference3 activities, and partic-
j- Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. This article is a preliminary draft of
a chapter which will appear in somewhat condensed form in a forthcoming book entitled
American Maritime Policy by the author and Mr. Peter Karasz, whose careful reading of
this draft and helpful comments thereon are gratefully acknowledged. This is the first
installment of a two-part article. The second part will appear in the Winter 1970 Issue,
Volume 37, Number 2.
1 JOINT ECONOMIC CoMal., DISCRIMINATORY OCEAN FREIGHT RATES AND THE BALANCE OF
PAYM ENTS, S. REP. No. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 DOUGLAS
ComrIrrEE REPORT]. See also Hearings on Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the
Balance of Payments Before the Joint Economic Comm., 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, 193-4
(1968) (statement of Senator Douglas), and ANTITRUST SuBCOMM. OF THE HousE CoaMN. ON
THE JUDICIARY, THE OCEAN FREIGHT INDUSTRY, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
898-9 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CEhixa COMMrITE REPORT].
2 "Whatever the reason, between 1916 and 1959 no penalties were imposed under the
penal provisions of the Shipping Act and only 127 proceedings under the foreign trade
provisions of sections 14 to 17 were reported, of which about half resulted in regulatory
orders." Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HARV. L. REv. 635, 640 (1965). Since
the investiture of the Commission in 1961, docketed proceedings relating to sections 14
through 18 have very substantially exceeded 127 in number.
a Steamship conferences are associations of liner shipping firms which are formed and
persist out of a desire of the member lines to reduce competition amongst themselves.
They may or may not have a formal organization with a chairman or secretary and a
staff which exists independently of the staffs of the member lines. Whether they are
formally organized and meet regularly, or they are mere "48-hour agreements" under
which lines agree to consult and then quote identical rates (each firm reserving the right
of independent action on 48-hour notice to the rest), typically each member line has one
vote which counts equally with every other. Subjects of collective agreement and action
usually include not only freight rates but also most other terms and conditions of service.
Conferences differ widely in the extent to which they succeed in cartelizing their respec-
tive markets. The liner shipping market in which a given conference will operate is
usually defined by the boundaries of a single trade, that is, a group of routes linking one
group of ports to another, although there are numerous conferences which cover more
than one trade.
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ularly conference rate levels and rate-making practices, have entailed
extensive administrative proceedings and led to lengthy litigation
before the courts. Nearly all of the liner firms serving the United
States foreign trades have been affected. Moreover, these Commission
activities have led to formal protests from leading maritime powers
and to hostile foreign reactions, such as the passage of legislation
in Europe and Japan forbidding national flag lines to comply with
Commission orders and subpoenas relating to matters and documents
or records outside the borders of the United States.4 Perhaps most
serious of all, the example of such sustained American regulatory
activity has stimulated foreign emulation, introducing an increased
degree of parochial nationalism into what is the most international
of industries. With each passing year the specter of inconsistent reg-
ulation of liner shipping by the United States and its foreign trad-
ing partners, each intending in good faith to "protect" its own
commerce from "detriment" and "unjust discrimination," grows more
insistent.
Whether the national interest is sufficiently served to warrant the
costs, both present and future, of the Commission's activities is the
question addressed in this article. We will describe the regulatory
provisions of the Shipping Act of 1916, focusing especially on the
Federal Maritime Commission's efforts in both indirect and direct
rate regulation. We will then evaluate the law and the Commission's
regulatory activities in the field of international liner shipping in
terms of the national interest they are designed to serve.
I. THE LAW AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The underlying rationale of the Shipping Act of 1916 is the ad-
vancement of the economic welfare of American shippers (by which
term we include both exporters and importers) engaged in the for-
eign commerce of the United States. Both the original statute, the
product of the Alexander Committee investigations, and the 1961
amendments, the offspring of the Celler and Bonner Committee investi-
gations, are based on the premise that the national interest requires
the direct protection of shippers by specific statutory provisions and
the indirect safeguarding of their interests by related provisions de-
4 See Hearings on HR. 4299 Before the Special Subcomm. on Steamship Conferences
of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 140-4, 158-64
(1961); Hearings on H.R. 6775 Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 52-70 (1961); 1 A. CnAYEs,
T. EHRLICi & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRocFSs 425-50 (1968) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as CriAYrs].
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signed to protect and foster a strong American-flag merchant marine.
The notion is that, if the latter is strong, the former will not suffer
discrimination at the hands of foreign-flag shipping interests. Each
of the provisions of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, may
be easily and directly related to this conception of the national
interest,5 and in view of the nature of the American economy-the
United States is much more a nation of shippers than a nation of
steamship operators-this is the only conception of the national interest
which is capable of providing a meaningful rationale for American
shipping policy.
A. The Underlying Rationale of the Law
American shipping policy rests on three major legislative decisions,
two of them reached in 1916 with the passage of the original Ship-
ping Act, and the third reached at the time of its recent revision
by the Bonner Act amendments of 1961: (1) to exempt steamship
conferences from the antitrust laws; (2) to institute government reg-
ulation of conference practices; (3) to legitimate exclusive patronage
(dual-rate) contracts. Each of these decisions is the product of very
extensive legislative investigation and rests upon carefully articulated
justifications which are consistent throughout.
1. Exemption. of Steamship Conferences from the Antitrust Laws.
Commencing in 1912, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries of the House of Representatives, under the chairmanship of
Representative Joshua W. Alexander of Missouri, undertook two years
of investigations to determine "whether or not we should recognize
the agreements existing between carriers by water or recommend that
the Sherman antitrust law should be enforced against them and these
conferences broken up."6 The outcome was the often-cited Alexander
Committee Report,7 which attributed to the conference system a
variety of important advantages for.American exporters and importers
and concluded that unchecked competition (the assumed result of
the application of the antitrust laws to conferences) would seriously
injure the interests of all merchants in the foreign trades and partic-
ularly the interests of American exporters. In 1916, the legislation
5 Perhaps the strongest contemporary reading of the Shipping Act as a shipper-pro-
tection statute, and the closest identification of the national interest with the interests of
American shippers and especially exporters, is that of the Joint Economic Committee.
See generally 1965 DOUGLAS COMMITrTEE REPORT and the text at notes 166-72 infra.
6 54 CONo. REC. 8077 (1916) (statement of Congressman Alexander).
7 HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREE-
MENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADES, H.R. Doc. No.
805, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER COAIMITTEE REPORT].
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recommended by the Committee, which exempted conferences from
the antitrust laws and subjected them to regulation, was enacted in
almost the same form originally proposed by the Committee.
In the opinion of the Alexander Committee, "if honestly and fairly
conducted," conferences can provide "greater regularity and frequency
of service, stability and uniformity of rates, economy in the cost of
service, better distribution of sailings, maintenance of American and
European rates to foreign markets on a parity, and equal treatment
of shippers through the elimination of secret arrangements and under-
handed methods of discrimination." 8 Each of the foregoing advantages
would allegedly accrue directly to exporters and importers in ways
laboriously documented to the Committee by a parade of carrier and
exporter-importer witnesses. Certain other advantages of the confer-
ence system, also mentioned by the Committee, such as that it pro-
tected economically weaker carriers from falling prey to competition,
eliminated wasteful competition through rationalization of sailing
dates, and promoted economic distribution of costs of servicing un-
desirable locations through devices such as pooling arrangements,
while phrased in terms of aids to the carriers themselves, were also
clearly intended to be viewed as advantages to American merchants.
For it was alleged that the elimination of the smaller, weaker carriers
might lead to monopoly control of shipping services and that waste-
ful duplication of service would result in increased costs and, ulti-
mately, increased freight rates.
The alleged advantages of conferences aside, perhaps the prin-
cipal reason why the Alexander Committee decided to recommend
their legitimization was that it became convinced that to do other-
wise would be seriously impractical. It was argued that unchecked
competition would lead inevitably to the monopolization of the ship-
ping services upon which American exporters and importers depended,
and the demise of steamship conferences among the carriers serving
American trades would somehow disadvantage American merchants
in foreign markets:
It is the view of the Committee that open competition can-
not be assured for any length of time by ordering existing
agreements terminated. The entire history of steamship agree-
ments shows that in ocean commerce there is no happy me-
dium between war and peace when several lines engage in the
same trade. Most of the numerous agreements and conference
arrangements discussed in the foregoing report were the out-
come of rate wars and represent a truce between the contend-
8 Id. at 416.
1969]
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ing lines. To terminate existing agreements would necessarily
bring about one of two results: the lines would either engage in
rate wars which would mean the elimination of the weak and
the survival of the strong, or, to avoid a costly struggle, they
would consolidate through common ownership. Neither result
can be prevented by legislation, and either would mean a
monopoly fully as effective, and it is believed more so, than
can exist by virtue of an agreement. Moreover, steamship
agreements and conferences are not confined to the lines en-
gaging in the foreign trade of the United States. They are as
universally used in the foreign trade of other countries as in
our own. The merchants of these countries now enjoy the fore-
going advantages of cooperative arrangements, and to restore
open and cutthroat competition among the lines serving the
United States would place American exporters at a disadvan-
tage in many markets as compared with their foreign competi-
tors.9
It would seem clear, then, that the national interest was conceived
of as synonymous with that of the American exporter-importer and
from this conception emerged the justification for exempting steam-
ship conferences from the reach of the antitrust laws.
2. Government Regulation of Conference Practices. The antitrust
exemption, however, was not alone the keystone of the original Ship-
ping Act. Rather, this role was shared by the regulatory scheme created
to police and control certain abusive, anti-competitive practices con-
sidered disadvantageous to American exporters and importers, all of
which were attributed by the Alexander Committee to the limited
monopoly power possessed by existing conferences. 10 In brief, if the
American merchant was to obtain the alleged benefits of the conference
system, only diligent government regulation could assure it to him:
The Committee believes that the disadvantages and abuses
connected with steamship agreements and conferences as now
conducted are inherent, and can only be eliminated by effec-
tive government control; and it is such control that the Com-
mittee recommends as the means of preserving to American
exporters and importers the advantages enumerated, and of
preventing the abuses complained of.1
The outcome was a trade-off between the antitrust exemption and
a comprehensive regulatory program specifically prohibiting a vari-
9 Id. at 416-7.
10 Id. at 504.
11 Id. at 418.
[Vol. 37:90
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ety of practices considered to embody the worst of all conference
abuses. These specific prohibitions were to be supplemented by an
on-going, affirmative policy of government supervision to be admin-
istered by an agency fully empowered to disapprove and cancel any
conference agreements which it found to be discriminatory, unfair,
or detrimental to the commercial interests of the United States.12
Moreover, the performance of any such agreement before public
filing and agency approval, or at any time after its disapproval or
cancellation, was to be declared unlawful and subject to the full
penalties of the antitrust laws, in addition to substantial fines. In its
most important provisions, this is the bare-boned structure of the
basic regulatory scheme as it presently exists. As we shall show in
the detailed review of the statute which follows shortly below, each
provision of the law can be properly understood only in the context
of congressional concern that American exporters and importers
obtain the alleged advantages for which conferences were originally
legitimated, as well as adequate protection against abuse of the market
power which conferences were thought inherently to afford the car-
riers belonging to them.
3. Legitimization of Dual-Rate Contracts. Dual-rate contracts are
exclusive patronage contracts under which a signer obtains a lower
rate than a non-signer although both may be exporters or importers
of identical cargoes. Not all conferences utilize such contracts; in
fact, at present about 58 per cent do not.13 But those that do have
traditionally utilized them as a defense against competition, that is,
to exclude nonconference lines from their market by foreclosing to
them the custom of nearly all exporters and importers of any sig-
nificance in the trade.14 For this reason, the legality of dual-rate
contracts under the antitrust laws and the Shipping Act of 1916
had been contested for many years prior to 1958 by independent
carriers, the Department of Justice, and an occasional exporter or
importer, both in the courts and before the regulatory agencies which
from time to time administered the Shipping Act.' 5
In 1958, the issue was resolved when the Supreme Court held
12 Id. at 419-21.
13 Calculated from FEDERAL MARITIME CoMmissIoN, APPRovED INTERCONFERENCE AGREE-
MENTS OF STEAMSHIP LINES IN THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, January 1,
1966-January 1, 1968.
14 See text at note 27 infra; S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reported in
2 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 3108, 3127-30; see also CssT.R COMMrrEE REPORT 216-22.
15 For a history of this litigation, see Dodds, Legality of Shipper Tying Arrangements
in Ocean Commerce, 23 U. PITT. L. R.v. 933 (1962); see also CELLER ComMnrrra REPORT
210-5.
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the use of such a contract under the circumstances in the case at bar,
Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen,6 to be a "'resort to other
discriminating or unfair methods' to stifle outside competition in viola-
tion of [the Shipping Act of 1916] Section 14 Third.' 1 7 Although the
Court qualified its holding with the statement that section 14 third
"strikes down dual-rate systems only where they are employed as pred-
atory devices"-a factual determination to be made by the Federal
Maritime Board in each casel'--the Isbrandtsen decision was widely,
and quite properly, viewed as throwing substantial doubt on the le-
gality of all existing dual-rate contracts.19 In the confusion which
followed, the industry appealed to Congress for aid, and legislation
was quickly passed suspending the impact of the Isbrandtsen decision
until Congress could fully investigate the problem and produce a
legislative solution.20
In the extensive congressional investigations21 which commenced
immediately after the passage of the dual-rate moratorium law, wit-
nesses for the Federal Maritime Board, the steamship industry and
a variety of shipper groups took the position that dual-rate contracts
were essential to the survival of the steamship conference system
and to the attainment of its purported advantages for exporters and
importers. In brief, the proponents of an enabling law overturning
the Supreme Court's Isbrandtsen decision argued repetitively that
16 356 U.S, 481 (1958).
17 Id, at 493.
18 Id. at 499.
19 See Auerbach, The Isbrandtsen Case and Its Aftermath, 1959 Wisc. L. REv. 223,
245-51; ,ee a4o S. REP. No. 860, supra note 14, at 3116. The essence of the problem was
that all dual-rate contracts are exclusionary and thus, arguably, "predatory" with respect
to independent competition.
20 Act of August 12, 1958, P.L. 85-626, 72 Stat. 574 (expired June 30, 1960). Dual-rate
contracts in existence on May 28, 1958, the date of the Isbrandtsen decision, were de-
clared lawful for a two-year period under the Shipping Act unless and until disapproved
by the Federal Maritime Board. The moratorium was later extended for various periods
until April 3, 1964, at which time all prior contracts not meeting the preconditions re-
quired by Bonner Act amendments to the Shipping Act of 1916 and duly approved by
the newly constituted Federal Maritime Commission, were finally declared illegal, 75
Stat. 762 (1961). For a history of the moratorium legislation and its effects through 1962,
see CELLER CommnMnrE REFPORT 215 n.23 and sources cited therein. The moratorium was
later justified by Senator Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, as
"emergency" legislation designed only to allow Congress time for deliberation. 107 CONG.
Rxc. 19343 (1961).
21 Hearings on the Ocean Freight Industry Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1, vols. I-IV and pt. 2, vols.
I-I (1959-60) [hereinafter cited as Celler Committee Hearings]; id., 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 10, pt. 3, vols. I-I (1961). Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Steamship Con-
ferences of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts. I-11 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Bonner Committee Hearings].
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the dual-rate system was "indispensable to the strength of a confer-
ence", helpful in preventing malpractices in the trade in violation
of conference agreements and the Shipping Act, and responsible for
"assuring the stability of rates necessary to permit and encourage
forward trading" by exporters and importers.2 2 The argument was
universally couched in terms of protection of the merchant's interest
in regular, frequent and high-quality service, the prevention of un-
settling rate wars, and the elimination of practices which resulted
in rate discrimination between shippers and ports.23
In nearly all particulars, the legislative committees of both houses
were convinced by the foregoing arguments, despite their very serious
vulnerability24 and the determined opposition of the Department of
Justice.25 However, the House version of the bill, while legitimizing
dual-rate contracts, nevertheless basically reaffirmed the Supreme
Court's Isbrandtsen decision by including language specifically de-
signed to protect independent competition from the "predatory" use
of such contracts by conferences. The Commission, under this bill,
would have been required to disapprove the use of any dual-rate
system which it found was intended or reasonably likely to cause the
exclusion of any other carrier from the trade.26 This language wag
stricken from the bill in the Senate Commerce Committee on the
ground that:
Examination of the record in the House and before the Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of your committee
reveals overwhelmingly that every effective dual-rate contract
used by a conference is intended, and reasonably likely, and
tends to cause nonconference lines either to join the confer-
22 CELLER CoMmrrr REPORT 216; see also REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMm. ON STEAM,%I-
SHIP CONFERENCES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, H.R. REP.
No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
23 See, e.g., the synthesis offered by Dodds, supra note 15, at 949-58, and the arguments
of the Federal Maritime Board, In re the Statement of Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight
Conference (Isbrandtsen case on remand from the court of appeals), 4 F.M.B. 706, 736-42
(1955).
24 See, e.g., the trenchant attacks on the foregoing justifications mounted in the Senate
by Senator Estes Kefauver, note 28 infra; by the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, CELLER CoMTrrrEE REPORT 216-22; and by the Department of Justice
in testimony before the Bonner Committee, Bonner Committee Hearings, pt. I at 164
et seq.
25 See, e.g., testimony of Lee Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, during Hearings on H.R. 4299 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Steamship Conferences of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 423-56 (1961).
26 S. REP. No. 860, supra note 14, at 3127-30.
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ence using the contract or to leave the trade for happy hunting
elsewhere.
Clearly, then, under standards such as these, few if any effec-
tive dual-rate contracts could be approved by the Commission.
And those which were approved would be under a constant
sword of disapproval .... 27
When the bill reached the floor of the Senate, Senator Estes Kefauver,
armed with extensive documentation,2 8 led the fight for the restora-
tion of the House language. What ensued was an elaborate floor fight
over the Kefauver amendments, culminating in the only extensive
congressional debate in modern times over the national interest as
it is affected by the existence and operation of the conference system
in the international shipping economy.
The opponents of the Kefauver amendments early took the position
that the conference system itself was at stake; that without the right
to institute what were inherently exclusionary dual-rate contracts, the
system could not survive in the deluge of rate wars which the House-
passed bill was said to assure. In most respects, their arguments for
conferences paralleled those advanced by the Alexander Committee,
47 years earlier, and the defenses for dual-rate contracts which had
been raised before the legislative committees.2 9 In addition* Senators
from major maritime states urged that the survival of the American-flag
merchant marine would be threatened if dual-rate contracts were jeop-
ardized, for after the predicted demise of conferences, the higher cost
American carriers would allegedly not be able to compete with the
lower cost foreign-flag operators. 30 However, in view of Senator Kefau-
ver's arguments-acknowledged by his opponents3 1-that the Ameri-
can-flag lines were subsidized precisely to avoid this dire result and
that conferences in American trades were dominated by foreign-flag
lines, the principal defense of dual-rate contracts was placed not upon
the needs of the American-flag liner industry, but rather upon the needs
of American exporters and importers and their allegedly widespread
support for the dual-rate law without antitrust amendments. 32 Thus,
in the l1th hour, when Senator Kefauver's amendments restoring the
House bill's original antitrust language had passed and were being
27 Id. at 3128-9.
28 His lengthy speech on the Senate floor appears at 107 CONG. Rsc. 19335-74 (1961).
29 107 CONG. REc. 19334, 19420-8.
30 Id. at 19421, 19428.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 19427.
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reconsidered, 33 the leaders of the opposition, Senators Engle and Long
of Louisiana urged that the antitrust standards be dropped on the
ground that an effective dual-rate system-even if necessarily destruc-
tive of independent competition-was in the interest of American
exporters and importers.34
In the end, the Kefauver amendments were defeated, and Con-
gress rejected the antitrust approach to conference regulation repre-
sented by the Isbrandtsen decision. The Congress recognized the
steamship conferences as a "limited or qualified monopoly system"85
but justified their existence in shipper-protection terms. Accor-
dingly, rather than hedging the legitimization of dual-rate contracts
with antitrust restrictions, Congress amended other sections of the
Shipping Act of 1916, to strengthen the regulatory powers of the newly
created Federal Maritime Commission; 36 to further restrict confer-
ence powers by explicit language establishing new prerequisites for
the legality of their basic agreements; and to protect exporters and
importers even further by a battery of mandatory restrictions on the
terms and conditions of the dual-rate contracts which the Commission
was now authorized to approve.37 In language and impact, the Bonner
Act amendments of 1961 are surely the most explicit congressional
statement to date of the identity of the national interest with the
interests of American exporters and importers.
B. Highlights of the Law
The Shipping Act of 1916 was not enacted merely to regulate
steamship conferences. It was primarily "An Act to establish a United
States Shipping Board for the purpose of encouraging, developing,
and creating a naval auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant
marine to meet the requirements of the commerce of the United
33 Id. at 19422-8.
34 Id. at 19427.
35 Id. at 19334 (remarks of Senator Engle, manager of the bill in the Senate). The con-
text of his remarks was as follows: "We have provided a limited or qualified monopoly
system. There is no question about it. I call it a qualified monopoly, because ordinarily a
monopoly excludes everybody. The bill provides that every shipping line that wishes to
do so may enter the conference."
36 One such provision, section 18(b)(5), empowering the Commission to "disapprove
any conference rate, fare, or charge which after hearing it finds to be so unreasonably high
or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States," was defended by its
author, Senator Kefauver, as "a last effort to provide some protection-even though only
a small amount-to American shippers." Id. at 19429.
37 These and other provisions of the Bonner Act amendments are described in detail
in the text below.
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States. . .. ,,38 Of the 36 sections of the original Act, the provisions
exclusively devoted to regulatory measures occupy approximately eight
sections commencing with section 14. The preceding sections were
concerned with United States-flag fleet promotion and operation and
the remaining ones with procedural rules and the enforcement and
investigatory powers of the newly created Shipping Board.
Section 14 was essentially a criminal statute outlawing a variety
of conference practices, such as deferred rebates, fighting ships, retal-
iation against shippers' patronizing nonconference competitors, and
certain forms of "unfair or unjust" practices, all of which were con-
sidered extremely damaging to exporters and importers and competi-
tion. These were declared misdemeanors punishable by a fine of not
more than $25,000. Section 15 established the basic scheme of con-
ference regulation, consisting of agreement filing, Shipping Board
approval, and the antitrust exemption. Sections 16 and 17 forbade
discriminatory preferences in favor of particular persons, "localities,"
or commodities, rate cutting by various methods considered unfair
and dishonest, and other unfair competitive practices. Sections 18 and
19 established a comprehensive system of interstate shipping regula-
tion. Section 20 forbade all common carriers and their agents to
disclose or utilize information respecting cargoes to the detriment
or prejudice of any shipper, consignee, or other carrier. And, finally,
sections 21 and 22, respectively, empowered the Board to require
carriers and other persons subject to the act to file reports of "Any
facts and transactions appertaining to the business of such carrier or
other person" as the Board may require, and established procedures
by which the Board may award reparations to "any person" injured
by violations of the Act.
In examining these sections of the original Act, as modified, and
in places enlarged, by the 1961 Bonner amendments, we shall first
treat the law governing the approval of steamship conference agree-
ments; next, the requisite terms and conditions of the "approvable"
dual-rate contract; and finally, the explicit shipper-protection pro-
visions built in to limit the exercise by the carriers of whatever
usable monopoly power the statute may have incidentally created
or legitimated.
1. Approval of Conference Agreements. Whatever they might have
been in form and operation prior to 1916, and even as late as 1961,
steamship conferences in the United States foreign trades are now the
creatures of the 87th Congress. Conference membership is now com-
pletely open-ended; competing conferences may agree to agree on
38 39 Stat. 728 (1916).
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rates, but may not bind each other to do so; conferences must
undertake to prevent their members from chiseling rates in times
of excess capacity, even though for most such an endeavor has never
been thought worth the effort; and, finally, conference members are
required to make themselves available for negotiations with exporters
and importers. Conferences are not merely mandated by the law in
each of the foregoing respects; rather, their very existence is pre-
conditioned on compliance.
(a) Freedom of entry and exit. Section 15 of the Shipping Act
permits agreements between competing carriers which eliminate rate
and service competition, but only under certain conditions. The agree-
ments must explicitly permit "admission and readmission to confer-
ence membership of other qualified carriers in the trade" in addition
to providing "that any member may withdraw from membership
upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal." 39 This
language was introduced into the Act by the 1961 amendments spe-
cifically to eliminate spurious restrictions on conference membership,40
which had on occasion been permitted by the predecessor agencies
of the Federal Maritime Commission. The new language has been
interpreted by the Commission to require "that membership must
be completely open subject only to routine conditions. 4 1 Conse-
quently, the Commission has ruled that all conference agreements
must contain language substantially as follows:
Any common carrier by water which has been regularly
engaged as a common carrier in the trade covered by this
agreement, or who furnishes evidence of ability and intention
in good faith to institute and maintain such a common carrier
service between ports within the scope of this agreement, and
who evidences an ability and intention in good faith to abide
by all the terms and conditions of this agreement, may here-
after become a party to this agreement by affixing its signa-
ture thereto.42
The conference may require that new members pay admission fees,
which in some instances have been set as high as $5,000, pay any out-
standing financial obligations arising from prior membership, and
post a security bond or make a deposit to guarantee performance
of the terms and conditions of the agreement.43 Bonds and deposits
39 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
40 Agreement No. 9218, North Atlantic Continental/North Atlantic Westbound Freight
Conference, 9 F.M.C. 415, 422 (1966); CruLa Commrrnan REPORT 96-98.
41 9 F.M.C. at 422.
42 46 CF.R. § 5232(a) (1969).
48 Id.
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for the latter purpose have, with Commission approval, been set as
high as $50,000, 44 although the normal range is between $10,000 and
$25,000.
. The Commission has also ruled that every conference agreement
must contain language (a) assuring prompt action on membership
applications; (b) specifically abjuring the right to deny admission or
readmission if the routine conditions for membership are met; (c)
committing the conference promptly to notify the Commission of
all admissions and denials of admission to membership, accompanied,
in the latter case, by "a statement of the reasons therefor"; and (d)
assuring all members that they may withdraw from the conference
without penalty on 30 days' written notice.45 Moreover, every confer-
ence must explicitly relinquish the power to expel any member ex-
cept for failure to maintain the minimum sailing requirements, which
the agreement itself must specify, or for violations of the terms and
conditions of the agreement. Nor can the agreement permit expul-
sion until the expelled party and the Commission have been fur-
nished a "detailed statement setting forth the reason or reasons there-
for."46 Agreements not meeting all of the foregoing preconditions
substantially in haec verbis may be disapproved by the Commission.47
(b) The right of independent action. Section 15 also countenances
rate agreements between carriers not members of the same conferences
when the contracting parties are serving "different trades that would
otherwise be naturally competitive. ' 48 However, under present law
this is a rather limited dispensation, as the 1961 amendments to sec-
tion 15 explicitly direct the Commission to disapprove any such agree-
ment "unless in the case of agreements between carriers, each carrier,
or in the case of agreements between conferences, each conference
retains the right of independent action. '49 The FMC has therefore
ruled that no such agreement may require a delay of more than ten
days before either party "may take action or follow procedures in-
dependent of those agreed upon."50
Underlying this provision of the Bonner Act was the notion that
44 CE.ER Commirra- REPORT 97 n.11.
45 46 C.F.R. § 523.2(b)-(f) (1969).
46 46 C.F.R. § 523.2(i) (1969).
47 Pacific Coast European Conference v. FMC, 376 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
48 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964). Precisely what constitutes "naturally competitive trades" has
never been defined, but it would seem that if two conferences consider their individual
ratemaking decisions so interdependent that they require an agreement limiting the
discretion that each may exercise, then they must be serving "naturally competitive
trades."
49 Id.
50 46 C.F.R. § 529.2 (1969).
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rates for any given trade should be controlled exclusively by the
carriers serving that trade, not by carriers serving competing routes.
The theory is that importers and exporters will obtain "fair and equi-
table" rates only if the lines which in fact serve them have the ultimate
ratemaking discretion, for carriers serving competing routes are con-
cerned only with protecting themselves and their own customers from
competition. The example most often cited in this regard has been
Joint Agreement No. 8200 between the Far East Conference and the
Pacific Westbound Conference under which each conference pos-
sessed a veto over the rate actions of the other. 1 This agreement
allegedly injured those exporters constrained by their location to ship
from only one coast, "by transferring the ultimate decision with re-
spect to their rates from the carriers immediately serving them to the
carriers on the other coast who have no knowledge of or necessarily
any interest in the welfare of the particular shipper.15 2
In keeping with this notion of fairness, the House version of the
bill required the disapproval of agreements not only between confer-
ences, but also between carriers serving naturally competitive trades,
unless the agreement provided for a "right of independent action."
Under severe pressure from the industry, which was now faced with
the impending disapproval of many existing conference agreements,
the Senate struck out this provision, but in the Conference Commit-
tee, it "receded from its position with an amendment, accepted by
the House conferees, limiting the prohibition on carrier agreements
to carriers not members of the same conference. '5 3 With respect to
interconference agreements, the final version of the Bonner Act
amendments reflected the original House bill.
As with many other congressional compromises, this one promptly
raised complex and troublesome questions, one of which the Com-
mission, to its credit, recognized in an important 1965 decision re-
garding the Atlantic, Gulf and Great Lakes/Australia-New Zealand
trades. In this case, certain carriers serving the Atlantic and Gulf ports
amended their conference agreement to include the Great Lakes/
Australia-New Zealand trade, but with an arrangement granting the
Atlantic and Gulf carriers a binding veto over any rates set by the
Great Lakes carriers beneath prevailing Atlantic and Gulf levels.
Although this arrangement would have functioned within one and
the same conference, the Commission found it to be "the same, in
51 H.R. Rrn,. No. 498, supra note 22, at 9-10.
52 Id. at 10.
53 CONFERENCE REP. No. 1247, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reported in 2 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 3143, 3145.
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practice, as that which Congress sought to prohibit," for if, by includ-
ing two or more trades within a single conference, the carriers
serving one trade can veto the rates of carriers serving the others, "the
independent action requirement of section 15 would be a nullity. 5 4
While, to be sure, this holding enforces the spirit, if not the language,
of the Act, it seems to be in derogation of the explicit terms of the
Senate-House compromise from which the law emerged. Nevertheless,
on the conference's petition for review the Commission's interpreta-
tion of the Act was apparently sustained by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, but, due to the peculiarly indecisive nature
of that court's opinion, the question remains somewhat unsettled. 5
Since, as we shall note below, the "independent action" provision
can have profound effects on the ratemaking process, it is regrettable
that the reach of the clause is still uncertain. But, there is still an-
other uncertainty that merits equal consideration. Even were the
difficulties of defining the phrase "naturally competitive" somehow
avoidable,5 6 it may not be so easy to avoid defining precisely what
is a "trade." If a trade be defined as "a group of routes linking one
geographical area to another,"57 then there are many significant con-
ferences which encompass more than one trade and permit a num-
ber of their member lines to vote (often with decisive impact under
the applicable voting rules) on rates affecting trades not served by
them. For example, the Far East Conference includes two distinct
trades, i.e., two separable groups of routes linking two geographical
areas with the Far East; one from Atlantic and one from Gulf ports.
Not all the lines serve both the Atlantic and Gulf ports. The same is
the case with other important conferences encompassing trades emanat-
ing from the Atlantic and Gulf ranges to other geographically sep-
arate and competing foreign ranges of ports in Europe, Africa, Asia,
and Latin America. In the unlikely event that the Commission's
54 In re Agreement Nos. 6200-7 et al.-U.S. Atlantic & Gulf/Australia-New Zealand
Conference, 9 F.M.C. 1, 7 (1965).
55 Although it was argued, the court ignored the incongruity between the Commis-
sion's interpretation and the legislative history of the "independent action" provision,
but, nonetheless, remanded the case to the Commission for the correction of what it per-
ceived as "logical untidiness." And, while holding that the Commission could properly
disapprove the veto arrangement on a finding that it "operated to the detriment of the
commerce of the United States," the court found that "it is not absolutely certain from
the context" that the Commission in fact intended to make such a finding. U.S. Atlantic
& Gulf/Australia-New Zealand Conference v. FMC, 364 F.2d 696, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
56 See note 48 supra.
57 Hearings on Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments Be-
fore the Joint Economic Comm., 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. I, at 135-68 (1963); D. MARX,
INTERNATioNAL SHIPIN CARTELs 137-8 (1953); and Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Ship-
ping, 78 Hav. L. Ray. 635 (1965).
[Vol. 37:90
Federal Maritime Commission
ruling in the Australia-New Zealand case were given general appli-
cability, there would inevitably be a substantial restructuring of Amer-
ican steamship conferences.58
(c) The self-policing requirement. Another Bonner Act amend-
ment to section 15 empowers the Commission to disapprove any
conference agreement "on a finding of inadequate policing of the obli-
gations under it." The wording and placement of this provision
emerged from a compromise in the Senate-House Conference Com-
mittee resulting in the elimination of the House requirement that
conference agreements contain "effective provisions" for self-policing
as a precondition to Commission approval. 9 The Senate objected to
such a prerequisite to approval in the first instance, and replaced it
with language emphasizing that the Commission was to inquire into
the adequacy of self-policing under such agreements once they were
functioning. However, not long after the enactment of the amend-
ments, the Commission reversed the Conference Committee's compro-
mise by promulgating a rule which in effect read the original language
of the House bill back into the statute.6° Subsequently, its first order
disapproving a conference agreement not containing a detailed de-
scription of the requisite self-policing system was sustained on appeal
-- on the theory that for the Commission to require the incorporation
of "some systematic and regular procedures... [by] compulsory amend-
ment of the agreement is a reasonable manner of ensuring that the
conference has in fact adopted a policing system and that it is brought
clearly to the Commission's attention."'61
The origin of this provision of the law lies in the extensive revela-
tions of "malpractices," such as secret rate cutting and other forms
58 Among those conferences affected would also be (a) the few which include within
their jurisdiction both the inbound and outbound routes, which have, in all geographical
markets, normally been considered separate trades, see D. MARx, supra note 57, (b) the
42 American conferences whose jurisdiction included Canadian ports as of 1962, CFT.LR
Com.srrrm REPORT 337, and (c) the many American conferences which, although emanat-
ing from a single range of United States ports, include so wide a range of foreign ports
that, under the traditional definition, they encompass more than one "trade," e.g., the
American conferences serving the Far East, the Mediterranean and South Asia. As it is
obvious that all lines that belong to many of these conferences do not serve each of the
included but separable "trades," and yet vote on rates regarding all of them, the Com-
mission's Australia-New Zealand decision has a potentially enormous impact.
59 CONFERNcE REP. No. 1247, supra note 53, at 3145.
60 "Conference agreements and other rate-fixing agreements . . .whether or not pre-
viously approved, shall contain a provision describing the method or system used by the
parties in policing the obligations under the agreement, including the procedure for
handling complaints and the functions and authority of every person having responsi-
bility for administering the system." 46 C.F.R. § 528.2 (Supp. 1969).
61 Outward Continental North Pacific Freight Conference v. FMC, 385 F.2d 981, 984
(2d Cir. 1967).
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of personal favoritism practiced by members of nearly all conferences
which the Celler and Bonner Committees investigated.62 These var-
ious forms of chiseling on agreed conference rates were considered
by nearly all members of the congressional investigatory and legis-
lative committees to negate many of the basic advantages for ex-
porters and importers which traditionally had been claimed for the
conference system. 3
The hearings, records, and committee reports indicate that it was
widely believed that only the largest exporters and importers obtained
these secret rate cuts and otherwise benefited from such sub rosa
competition; smaller exporters and importers were thus allegedly dis-
criminated against, despite the claim that conferences assure equal
treatment for all exporters and importers. Secondly, chiseling and other
malpractices which constitute an important means of intraconference
competition inevitably produce intramural retaliation, in self-defense
if nothing else, and thereby allegedly undermine conference solidar-
ity and the rate and service stability upon which all exporters and im-
porters are said to depend. Finally, it was frequently argued that the
major perpetrators and prime beneficiaries of competitive "malprac-
tices" were the foreign-flag members of the conferences, all of which
allegedly engaged in their illegal activities abroad, beyond the reach
of American authorities. Consequently, failure of the conferences ef-
fectively to police their agreements was injurious to the competitive
position of the American-flag conference lines, for which the Congress
has always been very solicitous. 64 Thus, the self-policing requirement
of amended section 15 may be viewed as the direct outcome of tradi-
tional shipper-protection and United States-flag fleet promotion con-
siderations.
(d) Procedures for hearing exporters' and importers' requests and
complaints. Reacting to shipper testimony that steamship conference
offices, particularly in the inbound trades, were often located in out-
of-the-way places, or that conference personnel had rendered them-
selves otherwise inaccessible, 65 Congress amended section 15 to require
that the Commission disapprove the operation of conferences demon-
62 See, e.g., CELLER COmmI-sEE REPORT 249-79; Note, Self-policing of Ocean Shipping
Conferences, 20 STAN. L. REv. 724, 726-7 (1968).
63 See CaLiER CorfrrrE REPORT and citations therein, upon which the congressional
consensus summarized in the following paragraph is based.
64 It is important to remember that perhaps the primary reason, after national de-
fense, for the long standing congressional policy of U.S.-flag shipping promotion and sub-
sidization is the belief that in the absence of a large, competitive American commercial
fleet, American exporters and importers would be at the mercy of foreign operators.
65 Hearings on H.R. 4299 Before the Special Subcomm. on Steamship Conferences of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 394, 412 (1961).
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strating a "failure or refusal to adopt and maintain reasonable pro-
cedures for promptly and fairly hearing and considering shippers'
requests and complaints." 66 Subsequently, the Commission promulgated
General Order 14 defining the phrase "shippers' . . . requests and com-
plaints," and requiring every ratemaking group operating under a
section 15 agreement to file with the Commission "a statement out-
lining in complete detail its procedures for the disposition of ship-
pers' requests and complaints."6' 7 The rules further provide that, on
a quarterly basis, every conference must file a detailed report with
the Commission describing the nature and date of all requests and
complaints received, the nature and date of conference action upon
them, the identity of the exporters or importers, and the reason for
every denial. Every conference domiciled abroad must designate a
resident representative in the United States to receive requests and
complaints and file the appropriate reports. Finally, every tariff issued
by an approved section 15 ratemaking group must contain "full in-
structions as to where and by what method shippers may file their
requests and complaints," together with sample forms. As in the case
of all other rules in accord with the 1961 amendments, the courts
have affirmed the Commission's disapproval of the section 15 agree-
ments of noncomplying carriers.""
(e) General standards for approval of section 15 agreements. In
addition to the foregoing requirements for section 15 agreements, the
law establishes four general grounds upon which the Commission,
after notice and hearing, may "disapprove, cancel or modify any
agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or
not previously approved by it." These grounds are that the agreement:
(a) is "unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers,
shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between ex-
porters from the United States and their foreign compet-
itors";
(b) operates or has operated "to the detriment of the com-
merce of the United States";
(c) is "contrary to the public interest"; or
(d) is "in violation of this chapter."
None of these has any particular content and in most reported
cases, they appear to be largely redundant. If a proposed or operative
agreement is held "unjustly discriminatory . . . ." it is also normally
63 46 U.S.C. § 814, as amended by P.L. 88-275, 78 Stat. 148 (1961).
67 46 CI.R. § 527.3 (Supp. 1969).
68 Outward Continental North Pacific Freight Conference v. FMC, 385 F.2d 981 (2d
Cir. 1967).
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found to operate "to the detriment of the commerce. . . ."69 And if
the intervening or protesting exporters and importers or ports can
show that they will suffer "unjust discrimination," they are con-
comitantly making out a case that the contested agreement is also
"in violation of this chapter," specifically sections 16 and 17. If any
one or all of the foregoing findings are made, the Commission will
also on occasion find the agreement "contrary to the public interest"; 70
yet, even where this additional malediction is not uttered, it is clear
that the agreement might just as easily have been disapproved under
this rubric as well.
But the "public interest" clause is not merely a catchall. Although
the last to be added, (the others were part of the original 1916 ver-
sion of the law), it shows every promise of dominating the entire
statute. The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase to grant the
Commission "considerably broader authority"7 1 to control the dis-
pensation of section 15's antitrust immunity than the Commission
had possessed under the three preexisting criteria alone. In the re-
cent American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) case, the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed a District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decision invalidating a Commission rule that conference restraints
which interfere with the policies of the antitrust laws will be approved
only if the conference can "bring forth such facts as would demonstrate
that the . . . [conference practice or] rule was required by a serious
transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in
furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.' 72
Labeling this the Commission's "antitrust test," the Supreme Court
explicitly held it "an appropriate refinement of the statutory 'public
interest' standard."73
The potential impact of this decision, however, comes less from
the holding itself than from the manner in which the Court defined
69 See, e.g., Imposition of Surcharge by the Far East Conference at Searsport, Maine, 9
F.M.C. 129 (1965); Cargo to Adriatic, Black Sea and Levant Ports, 2 U.S.M.C. 342 (1940);
FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien; 390 U.S. 238 (1968). Redundant use of these standards
also appears in Investigation of Ocean Rate Structures in the Trade Between United
States North Atlantic Ports and Ports in the United Kingdom and Eire-North Atlantic-
United Kingdom Freight Conference, Agreement No. 7100, North Atlantic Westbound
Freight Ass'n, Agreement No. 5850, 9 P & F SHIPPING RaE. 1ra. 1007 (1968) (opinion of
the presiding examiner).
70 See FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968). Recently, the FMC has
even struck down an agreement under section 15 using the "public interest" language
alone. Calcutta, E. Coast of India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference, FMC No. 67-33 (Sept.
14, 1967) (unreported Commission Opinion), rev'd, 399 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1968).
71 390 U.S. at 243.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 246.
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the standard's proper application. In confronting the contentions that
Congress deliberately rejected the application of antitrust standards
in the original Act and again in the 1961 amendments, and that their
judicial introduction into the law renders the "promise of antitrust
immunity meaningless," the Court commenced what may ultimately
be a total restructuring of the procedure, scope, and content of future
section 15 proceedings:
The Commission's approach does not make the promise of
antitrust immunity meaningless because a restraint that would
violate the antitrust laws will still be approved whenever a
sufficient justification for it exists. Nor does the Commission's
test, by requiring the conference to come forward with a justi-
fication for the restraint, improperly shift the burden of proof.
The Commission must of course adduce substantial evidence
to support a finding under one of the four standards of § 15,
but once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will
normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement
is "contrary to the public interest," unless other evidence in
the record fairly detracts from the weight of this factor. It is
not unreasonable to require that a conference adopting a par-
ticular rule to govern its own affairs, for reasons best known
to the conference itself, must come forward and explain to the
Commission what those reasons are.74
This is not an unprecedented reading of the statute. In several
prior, albeit isolated, cases carriers and conferences had been required
to justify their section 15 arrangements in terms of the public interest
or the "regulatory purposes of the Act." 75 But the important point
is that this view of the Commission's section 15 function has never
before had across-the-board applicability; rather the Act was read in
most instances as the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the
ASTA case had previously interpreted it. Conference agreements, pools,
and the like, have traditionally been approved unless the FMC found
them in violation of the Act's standards, irrespective of their benefits
for anyone but the carriers and conferences concerned-with the Com-
mission's public counsel or the occasional intervening protestant
bearing the negative burden of proof.76 Consequently, in the reports
74 Id. at 245-6.
75 See, e.g., Mediterranean Pools Investigation, 9 F.M.C. 2264 (1966); Rate Agreement
United States/Persian Gulf Trade, Agreement No. 8900, 8 F.M.C. 712 (1965).
76 See, e.g., Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract
Rate System, Agreement No. 8660, 10 P & F SHIPPING REG. REP. 249 (1968); The Dual
Rate Cases, 8 F.M.C. 16 (1964); Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Cia Anonima Venezulana de
Navegacion, 7 F.M.C. 345 (1964).
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of most section 15 cases, the Commission has acted as though it were
a hybrid judge and jury merely resolving essentially private disputes
between the proponents of section 15 agreements or modifications
and the protesting ports, exporters and importers, or carriers. In some
cases, pools, for example, have been disallowed because a participating
carrier convinced the Commission that its percentage share was too
small ("unjustly discriminatory")7 or that conditions had changed
making "unfair" a previously "fair" arrangement; 78 in others, port
equalization rules have been disapproved79 because the ports affected
successfully supported their claims under the section 15 standards;
and, in a significant number of the rest, intervening exporter-importer
interests or competing carriers or terminal operators brought forth
sufficient evidence of individual injury to force disapproval or mod-
ification of the entire agreement, one or more of its parts, or specific
related practices. Only in a minority of cases did the Commission or
its predecessors launch investigations on their own in which questions
of public import rather than specific parochial economic interests
became decisive. On the whole, then, prior to the ASTA case, it is
proper to say that the proponents of section 15 agreements needed
only rebut the arguments of the protesting intervenors; the proponent's
burden was generally negative.
Under the ASTA interpretation, this scenario is radically altered.
All section 15 agreements are prima facie restraints in violation of
the antitrust laws. Their overall purpose is to restrain competition,80
and each of the subsidiary inter-carrier covenants respecting rates,
brokerage commissions, on-carriage absorptions and the like, typically
incorporated in these agreements, along with the various rules to
implement them, are designed specifically to accomplish the larger
anti-competitive purpose. Thus, the mere existence of the agreement
and its subsidiary covenants, rules, and regulations provides "sub-
stantial evidence" of an antitrust violation authorizing the Commis-
sion to "require that the conference . . . come forward and explain"
the reasons why the Commission should dispense its antitrust exemp-
tion.
It is upon this threshold shifting of the burden of proof that the
77 River Plate and Brazil Conferences v. Lloyd Brasiliero and Moore-McCormick Lines,
Inc., 8 F.M.C. 479 (1964).
78 Northern Pan-American Line v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 8 F.M.C. 213 (1964).
79 Stockton Port District v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 9 F.M.C. 12 (1965).
80 This was explicitly recognized by the authors of the Bonner Act amendments to the
Shipping Act in 1961. See notes 24-35, supra, and accompanying text for the congressional
acceptance of the proposition. See also S. RE. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), re-
ported in 2 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3108, 3122-30.
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Commission's "considerably broader authority" to control the anti-
trust exemption must turn. But its effective implementation will re-
quire the Commission to break sharply with the bulk of its past
decisions which have required that some particular interest, whether
it be that of a port, a competing carrier, or an importer or exporter,
be injured-at present or in the future-in a demonstrable way. Under
the ASTA rule, the Commission would be justified even in taking the
somewhat extreme position that all section 15 agreements are inimical
to the public interest unless proven otherwise. However, to take this
position, the Commission cannot merely reject the seemingly haphaz-
ard pattern of past section 15 decisions, with their nearly exclusive
emphasis on the specific facts of every different case; it would have
to develop a coherent body of doctrine regarding those justifications
which will adequately meet the carriers' burden of proof under the
"contrary to the public interest" criterion. For this purpose, the Com-
mission could not do better than to make the underlying legislative
rationale for exempting conference agreements from the antitrust
laws the operative test: unless the proponents of a section 15 agreement
can show that it protects exporters or importers by assuring them the
claimed advantages of conferences, or for any similar reason, then such
an agreement or practice should not be approved.
(f) Application of the invigorated "public interest" standard. In
view of its possibilities for affirmative regulation as well as for delib-
erate contraction of the scope of the antitrust exemption, it is instruc-
tive briefly to study the implications of placing a burden of justification
on the proponents of section 15 agreements. For this purpose, the
ASTA case is a suitable vehicle. At issue in this case was the legality
under section 15 of (i) the westbound Atlantic Passenger Steamship
Conference agreement requirement that commissions to travel agents
be fixed by unanimous vote, both in the conference as a whole and
in the subcommittee responsible for recommending changes in confer-
ence rules, and (ii) the eastbound Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship
Conference rule prohibiting travel agents authorized to book passage
on conference vessels from also selling passage on nonconference ves-
sels, although such agents were permitted to sell airline tickets at
their pleasure. The former was referred to as the "unanimity rule"
and the latter as the "tying rule."
The Commission found that the unanimity rule "was responsible
for the existing disparity between effective commissions on air and
sea travel and for the delays in conference action to rectify the situa-
tion."' This disparity, in turn, was causing a diversion of passenger
3 390 U.S. at 247.
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business to the airlines, contrary to the interest of a majority of the
conference members and the merchant marine at large. Since the Com-
mission also found that the conference "had failed to establish any
important public interest served by the unanimity rule" and, more-
over, "that it invaded the principles of the antitrust laws more than
was necessary to further any valid regulatory purpose,"8 2 it disapproved
the rule under section 15 and ordered its elimination.
With respect to the tying rule, the Commission made a variety of
antitrust findings to the ultimate effect that the rule forecloses non-
conference lines from an opportunity to reach effectively 80 per cent
of all trans-Atlantic steamship passengers, thereby injuring their com-
petitive opportunities and limiting the options open to passengers
and agents alike. Then, rejecting the conference's justifications for the
tying rule, the Commission disapproved it and ordered its elimination
as "contrary to the public interest," as well as "unjustly discriminatory"
and "detrimental to the commerce of the United States."88
The actions of the Commission with respect to both rules are illu-
minating if viewed in juxtaposition. In the case of the unanimity rule,
the requirement that the conference affirmatively justify section 15
approval virtually ended the matter. The best argument the con-
ference could offer was that the rule protected the United States-flag
minority from majority control over "basic financial decisions." This,
not surprisingly, was easily brushed off by the Court,8 4 since the rule
cuts both ways at the very least, It may protect any given line from
coercion by the majority, but the majority may be coerced by the
veto of any given line-as allegedly happened in the ASTA case it-
self. The truth, of course, is that there can rarely be any logicaljustification for any given voting rule, whether in terms of the public
interest or some "valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act."
Voting rules are the result of compromise between the lines when the
conference is formed and whenever new members seek entry. As the
outcome of negotiated bargains, the most that can be said for them
is that they reflect a temporary balance of power. To require the con-
ference to offer an affirmative justification in terms other than a blow-
82 Id.
88 Id. at 252.
84
This is a bewildering contention, to say the least. The rule may enable a singleline to protect itself from a majority decision, but the rule in no way guarantees
that line control over its own financial decisions. Lack of unanimity does not
leave lines free to make independent decisions but simply freezes the existing
situation. In this way control over the basic financial decisions of all lines is
'surrendered' not to the majority, but to any single line that happens to oppose
change.
Id. at 249-50.
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by-blow description of the inter-carrier bargaining process itself, is
for the Commission effectively to decide the issue against the confer-
ence, ab initios5
By contrast, the tying rule can have substantive justifications, but
whether any given justification is acceptable under the law is, of course,
an entirely separate question. In essence, the tying rule is the func-
tional equivalent of a dual-rate contract, with travel agents occupying
the position of exporters or importers. Thus, predictably, the confer-
ence offered the same justification as that so tirelessly advanced on
behalf of dual-rate contracts: The rule, it was claimed, preserved the
stability of the conference by tying to it the great bulk of the passen-
ger market, thus encouraging members to remain in and outsiders to
join. Rather than quarreling with this theory, the Commission, and
later the court, merely found that the conference failed to carry the
burden of proof on this issue, and that by itself, "the theory was there-
fore insufficient to justify the undeniable injury to interests ordinarily
protected by the antitrust laws."8' 6 Certainly, such a result might have
been anticipated once the burden of proof had been shifted away
from the ASTA toward the conference; for with the rule in existence
for a great many years, if not from the conference's inception, it
would indeed have been surprising if the conference could have pro-
duced actual evidence of the evils of life without the rule.
Vhile this case surely demonstrates the significant outcome-deter-
minative effect of redistributing the burden of proof in section 15 cases,
it does not necessarily presage the end of a great many conference
rules and practices. Although procedural and structural rules, most
of which are based on nothing more than prudential bargains among
contesting competitors, are clearly vulnerable, there are a variety of
other conference rules and practices which are justifiable in terms
of the survival of the conference and the elimination of competitive
"malpractices"-if only the evidence could be obtained. To hold the
former kinds of rules and practices, which cannot be justified in pub-
lic policy terms, beyond the pale of section 15 is merely to provide
further limits on the nature and content of the bargains which car-
riers will be allowed to make in establishing steamship conferences.
s85 Accordingly, it is not surprising that on this issue the case was reduced to a squab-
ble over the facts and their interpretation. By holding that, "based on [its] special
familiarity with the shipping industry," the Commission was entitled to indulge in "con-
jecture" whenever the evidence was "incomplete" (390 US. at 249), the Court scuttled
this last ground for appeal not only for the ASTA respondents, but also for respondents
in all later section 15 litigation.
86 390 U.S. at 251.
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It is here that the newly invigorated "contrary to the public interest"
standard could have its primary impact.
2. Approval of dual-rate contracts. The 1961 amendments to the
Shipping Act require the Federal Maritime Commission to permit
individual carriers and conferences of carriers to offer exporters and
importers a limited kind of exclusive patronage contract, unless it
specifically finds that such a contract s7 "will be detrimental to the
commerce of the United States or contrary to the public interest,
or unjustly discriminatory, or unfair as between shippers, exporters,
importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and
their foreign competitors."88 In the event of such a finding, the con-
tract must be disapproved and its use thereafter is per se illegal. Prior
to Commission approval, implementation of such a contract is pro-
hibited.
The particular form of contract contemplated by the statute must
be "available to all shippers and consignees on equal terms and con-
ditions" and may, by its terms and operation, discriminate between
a shipper who agrees to "give all or any fixed portion of his patronage
to such carrier or conference of carriers" and a shipper who does not
choose to so commit himself. The former may be charged a lower rate
than the latter, even though both ship the same commodities; hence,
conferences utilizing a system of such contracts are commonly said to
be operating under a "dual-rate contract" system.
There is only one kind of dual-rate contract which the Commission
is authorized to approve, and its operative provisions have been pre-
scribed with such particularity that the existing contract system may
properly be viewed as the creation of the 87th Congress, albeit slightly
augmented by subsequent administrative interpretation. Nothing ex-
actly like the "approved" dual-rate contract antedated the 1961 amend-
ments, nor, in their present form, are the contract's basic terms and
conditions the outcome of private commercial negotiation. Rather, as
drawn by Congress the basic contract itself has become a primary
input in the process of commercial negotiation, principally by affect-
ing in various ways the relative bargaining power of carriers, on the
one hand, and exporters and importers on the other. What follows
is a rather detailed review of the prescribed content of the "approved"
contract; readers already familiar with the dual-rate system might do
well to skip to the next subsection.
87 All the statutory prerequisites for the legality of such contracts, including filing with,
and approval by, the Commission, are also applicable to any contract amendment or
modification subsequent to the Commission's initial approval.
88 46 U.S.C. § 818(a) (1964).
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(a) Prompt release. Section 14b requires that an approved dual-
rate contract permit "prompt release of the contract shipper [exporter
or importer] from the contract with respect to any shipment or ship-
ments for which the contracting carrier or conference of carriers can-
not provide as much space as the contract shipper shall require on
reasonable notice." In the interest of avoiding controversies over pre-
cisely what is meant by "prompt release," the Commission has required
that all dual-rate contracts fix a specific period of time within which
the conference must respond to the shipper's request for space and in
fact proceed to furnish the space promised.89 Accordingly, the Com-
mission has required the incorporation of the following clause in all
contracts:
If within three business days of such request the Conference
fails to secure space on a vessel scheduled to sail within 15
days of the date of the request from the Merchant as aforesaid
the Merchant shall be at liberty to secure such space on any
vessel whatsoever.90
In light of differences in "the reasonable commercial needs" of particu-
lar trades, the Commission will permit some variation in the foregoing
time period;91 but, presumably, the burden of proof rests heavily on
the conference concerned.
(b) 90 days notice of rate increases. Section 14b(2) provides that
whenever a dual-rate contract becomes effective with respect to a given
commodity rate, that rate "shall not be increased before a reasonable
period, but in no case less than ninety days." Upon examination of
the legislative history of this subsection, the Commission concluded
that the literal terms of the statute did not in fact accomplish the
actual congressional purpose, which was to permit exporters and im-
porters to know with certainty well in advance of shipment what the
prevailing freight rate will be. Accordingly, the Commission required
that all contracts provide that rate increases be published in the tariff
at least 90 days prior to effectiveness. 92 Also, to discourage "rate in-
creases which might be completely unacceptable to merchants" and
to make it unnecessary for the merchant "unqualifiedly to cancel his
contract upon notice of rate increase which he found unacceptable,"
89 The Dual Rate Cases, 8 F.M.C. 16, 27 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as The Dual
Rate Cases]. Hereafter, citation of mandatory contractual provisions will be to the Code
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.); explanation of the provisions are drawn from The Dual
Rate Cases.
90 46 CF.R. § 538.10 contract § 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as the Uniform Merchant's
Contract].
91 Id. at n.3.
92 Id. at § 4(a).
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all contracts must grant the merchant 30 days after notice of a rate
increase within which to tender the conference notice of contract
cancellation "to become effective as of the effective date of the pro-
posed increase." 3 Similarly, the conference is granted 30 days sub-
sequent to the expiration of the shipper's 30-day period within which
to notify the merchant of its rescission of the proposed increase.
Should the conference exercise this option, then the contract remains
in force "as if the proposed increase had never been made." Finally,
the conference is required to offer the merchant a subscription to its
tariffs "at a reasonably compensatory price" and to open its tariffs
to inspection at its offices and those of each member line.
(c) The "legal right" clause. Perhaps the most difficult problems
associated with dual-rate contracts concern which shipments are cov-
ered and what parties are bound by any given exporter's or importer's
signature. Due to the complexities involved, Congress left both prob-
lems more or less to the discretion of the Commission.94
The House version of section 14b(3) required all contracts to con-
tain a provision expressly limiting their coverage to "only those goods
of the contract shipper as to the shipment of which he has the legal
right at the time of shipment to select the carrier." The Senate added
a provision specifying that it was a breach of contract for the shipper
intentionally to relinquish his control of routing with the result
that the shipment is carried by a vessel of a carrier not a party
to the contract. On the assumption that the merchant alone will pos-
sess the facts necessary to establish his legal right to select the carrier,
for example, whether the sale was a bona fide f.a.s. rather than a clan-
destine c.i.f. transaction, the Commission approved an optional con-
tract provision raising a rebuttable presumption that the merchant
has the legal right to control routing "if he participated in the
arrangement for ocean transportation or if his name appears on a bill
of lading or export declaration as shipper or consignee."9 5
The second controversy concerned the binding effect of a merchant's
signature on companies affiliated with him. The Commission defined
the primary desideratum as a clause which would "make it less easy
for a signatory merchant to evade his obligations under the contract
through the subterfuge of using an affiliated company for nonconfer-
ence shipments"; however, the Commission interpreted the legisla-
93 Id.
94 S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reported in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 8108, 3121-2.
95 The Dual Rate Cases, 8 F.M.C. 27, 31 (1964). This provision has been incorporated
as an optional clause in section 6 of the Uniform Merchant's Contract.
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tive intent to bar conferences from binding the affiliate of a signatory
merchant "without regard to the merchant's control over the affiliated
company.''96 The result was a compromise requiring conferences de-
siring an "affiliates clause" to define the term "merchant" to include
not only the contract signatory himself, but also:
any of his parent, subsidiary, or other related companies or
entities who may engage in the shipment of commodities in
the trade covered by this contract and over whom he regularly
exercises direction and working control (as distinguished from
the possession of the power to exercise such direction and
control) in relation to shipping matters. .... 9.
(d) The "natural routing" clause. The fourth subsection of the
dual-rate statute requires approved contracts expressly to provide that
the contract shipper need not "divert shipment of goods from natural
routings not served by the . , . conference, . . where direct carriage
is available." As defined by the Commission, a natural routing "is
a traffic path reasonably warranted by economic criteria such as costs,
time, available facilities, the nature of the shipment and any other
economic criteria appropriate in the circumstances. ' 98 In practice, this
provision would allow a contracting exporter or importer to use non-
conference vessels only when use of a conference service requires him
to divert his cargoes away from his customary and most economical
ports of exit or entry, and nonconference service is direct and demon-
strably less expensive.
(e) Limitations on damages for breach. Should a merchant breach
his contract, subsection 5 limits damages recoverable by the confer-
ence to actual damages "to be determined after breach in accordance
with the principles of contract law," or liquidated damages which may
not exceed the contract freight rate on the shipment in question less
the cost of handling. Recognizing the explicit legislative intent to
outlaw anything in the nature of a penalty, the Commission has strictly
limited the power of conferences to suspend or terminate the rights
of contract shippers during and after any litigation between the parties.
Only if the merchant does not promptly dispute the conference's claim
that he has breached his contract, or promptly pay any damages for
which he may be adjudged liable, may his right to obtain contract
rates be suspended or terminated. Moreover, the conference may not
terminate the merchant's rights without also terminating his obligations
96 Id. at 32.
97 Id. at 33-34; Uniform Merchant's Contract § 1(b).
98 8 F.M.C. at 35; Uniform Merchant's Contract § 8.
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under the contract. Once the merchant pays the damages assessed
against him, his rights under the contract must immediately be rein-
stated.99
(f) Bilateral rights of cancellation. No dual-rate contract may be
approved which fails expressly to provide that the contracting exporter
or importer may terminate the contract at will, without penalty, upon
90 days notice. Carriers and conferences may do likewise, but sub-
ject to the proviso that once a contract system is terminated in whole
or in part, it may not be reinstated without prior Commission ap-
proval.
(g) Permissible spread between contract and noncontract rates.
While permitting contract signatories to obtain lower rates than non-
signatories, Congress restricted the spread to a maximum of 15 per
cent "of the ordinary rates." Moreover, as with all other aspects of
the system, no conference may decrease the spread or, if less than 15
per cent, increase it, without prior approval of the Commission.100
(h) Cargoes excluded from the contract. All approved contracts
must expressly exclude cargoes "loaded and carried in bulk without
mark or count except liquid bulk cargoes, other than chemicals, in
less than full shipload lots." Concluding that "the same factors which
prompted the exclusion of liquid chemicals would serve also to ex-
clude liquid petroleum," and with due regard for the difficulties of
distinguishing the former from the latter kinds of liquids, the Com-
mission has also ordered all contracts expressly to exclude liquid bulk
petroleum in less than shipload lots. 101
(i) Other mandatory and optional provisions. Section 14b(9) au-
thorizes the Commission further to qualify and condition the cover-
age and content of dual-rate contracts. Accordingly, the Commission
has promulgated a variety of other mandatory and permissive contract
provisions. Of the former, the six-month "charter exclusion" clause
is most important. All contracts must permit merchants to use owned
or chartered vessels, provided the term of the charter is six months
or more. This is a compromise solution to the problem of how to
protect conferences from "spot raiding" of cargoes while permitting
merchants the economies of scale which may be obtained by bona
fide proprietary carriage. In defining what is "proprietary," the Com-
mission has ruled that "ownership of or other appropriate legal inter-
est in cargo is the basic test"; conferences may not restrict the reach
99 8 F.M.C. at 36-37; Uniform Mechant's Contract § 11(e). See also 46 C.F.R. § 580.6
(b)(1) (1969).
100 See 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(2) (1964).
101 8 F.M.C. at 89-40.
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of the "charter exclusion" clause to cargo raised, grown, manufac-
tured, or produced by the merchant.10 2 Consequently, large trading
companies as well as firms manufacturing or producing a wide range
of goods are free to utilize charters for multi-commodity cargoes, in
a manner directly analogous to proprietary tramp shipping.
Perhaps the most important permissive ruling governs the ad-
justment of the contract system to a conference's occasional need to
meet outside competition by "opening rates."' 0 3 Recognizing that
rates are often opened in response to the demands of contract ship-
pers and that, in such cases, meeting the quickly changing rate quo-
tations of outsiders "requires that rate-fixing initiative be returned
to the individual conference members,"'1 4 the Commission ruled that
contract rates may be opened without advanced notice, freeing the
shippers affected thereby from their contract obligations. However,
rates may not again be closed without 90 days' notice to the trade,
and during the interval, the individual lines may not charge rates in
excess of the last published contract rate for a minimum period of
90 days from the date on which the rate was opened. 05 Thus, the
device of opening rates cannot be used to accomplish a rate increase
in less than the mandatory 90-day period. In sum, what the Commis-
sion has authorized is the temporary suspension of the contract sys-
tem as to specific commodities on which the conference may be facing
particularly severe independent competition.
(j) General standards for the approval of dual-rate contracts. Sec-
tion 14b of the Act requires the Commission to "permit" the use of
dual-rate contract systems, amendments, or modifications unless it
finds that the system would be "detrimental to the commerce of the
United States or contrary to the public interest, or unjustly discrim-
inatory or unfair as between shippers, exporters, importers, or ports,
or between exporters from the United States and their foreign com-
petitors." The Commission "shall withdraw permission" if it makes
similar findings regarding the system while in operation. By compar-
ison with the same phraseology in section 15 with respect to the
approval of conference agreements, the word "carriers" is conspic-
uously absent from the "unjustly discriminatory" clause. Doubtless,
this reflects the congressional decision to disregard the exclusionary
102 Pacific Westbound Conference Amendment to Dual Rate Contract, 9 F.M.C. 403
(1966).
103 A rate is "opened" when the conference rate is removed and each individual car-
rier is permitted to establish its own rate on a commodity through negotiations with the
exporters and importers concerned.
104 8 F.M.C. at 46.
105 Id. at 46-47; Uniform Merchant's Contract § 7(b).
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effects which dual-rate systems might have on nonconference carriers,
and the deliberate intention of the Senate Commerce Committee to
dispose of antitrust considerations. However, in view of the Supreme
Court's holding that antitrust standards are properly incorporated
within the broader "public interest" standard, it would now appear
that the Commission will be compelled to consider to some extent the
effect of the institution of a contract system on nonconference lines.
To date, it has not done so.
The very few reported decisions applying the general standards of
approvability have been exclusively concerned with the protection
of exporters and importers and ports. In two notable instances, the
Commission blocked attempts by conferences to include the Great
Lakes ports within contract systems already encompassing the Atlan-
tic and Gulf ranges.106 In each case, it appears obvious that the few
conference members serving the Lakes during the season when they
are open to navigation were faced with serious independent compe-
tition, while competition from the Atlantic and Gulf ports was negli-
gible. Many, if not all, important shippers from the Lakes were also
dependent on the conference's Atlantic and Gulf services. Conse-
quently, each conference was attempting to tie service in a monop-
olistic market to service in a more competitive market and thereby
obtain a position of strength in the latter which it could not other-
wise hope to attain. While the Commission declined in both instances
to permit such an arrangement, in only one of these cases did it
indicate an appreciation of the true motivation of the contract's pro-
ponents and the underlying problem of "leverage" which is involved
in situations of this kind. But, even in this latter instance, the threat
to independent Great Lakes carriers was nowhere mentioned.107 Con-
sequently, the pro-competitive outcome of these cases may have been
purely fortuitous. For the future, however, the newly discovered anti-
106 In re Agreement Nos. 6200-7, et al-U.S. Atlantic & Gulf/Australia-New Zealand
Conference, 9 F.M,C. 1 (1965), and The Dual Rate Cases (re: River Plate and Brazil Con-
ferences), 8 F.MC. at 44.
107 9 F.M.C. at 9. The Commission's specific findings were that the extension of the
dual-rate system to the Great Lakes in this manner would be "discriminatory," "detri-
mental to Commerce," and "contrary to the public interest." With respect to this part of
its decision, the Commission was upheld by the court of appeals, U.. Atlantic & Gulf/
Australia-New Zealand Conference v. FMC, 864 F.2d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In The Dual
Rate Cases, the Commission reached a similar conclusion regarding the attempt by the
newly formed Pacific Coast/Latin American Conference, which comprised ten individual
preexisting conferences, to bind exporters and importers by a single dual-rate contract
covering all ten of the trades in question. Characterizing the evil as forcing a shipper
desiring a contract in only one of the trades to sign a contract covering all of them, the
Commission vetoed the arrangement as "detrimental to commerce," 8 F.M.C. at 49-50.
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trust content of the "contrary to the public interest" standard would
appear to require the Commission to focus more directly and con-
sciously on the threat to nonconference carriers posed by permitting
conferences to utilize the device of the common dual-rate system in
order to link together trades in which they have substantial monop-
oly power with trades in which they face independent competition.
As nearly all of the largest American shippers route cargoes from
more than one range of ports to the same destination, permitting the
use of this device could have a significant market-foreclosing impact
on nonconference lines. 08
3. Prohibition of certain anti-competitive practices. The use of
deferred rebates and fighting ships, retaliation against shippers who
have patronized competing carriers or filed a complaint with the Federal
Maritime Commission, "unfair or unjustly discriminatory" contracts
with shippers based on volume of shipments, and other forms of "unjust
discrimination" in rates or space accommodations, are explicitly pro-
scribed by section 14.109 Violation of this section is a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a maximum fine of $25,000 for each offense. From the in-
ception of the Act to the present, there has existed a broad consensus
that each of these predatory practices was inherently inimical to compe-
tition. Not only are they widely believed to destroy independent liner
competition, and thus lead to conference monopolization of liner ser-
vices, but their effects on the welfare of exporters and importers have
been equally feared. The Alexander Committee, for example, explicitly
condemned the deferred rebate system not only for stifling noncon-
ference competition, but also for placing the exporter and importer
in a "position of continual dependence" on the conferences. 110 Of
course, retaliation against shippers, like all other forms of "unjust"
discrimination, was considered to be destructive of the competitive
capability of the victims in their respective export or import mar-
kets to the detriment of the nation's commerce.
With the exception of the Isbrandtsen cases,"' litigation under the
108 Curiously, the Commission, in the River Plate and Brazil Conferences decision, was
chiefly concerned with the fact that the conferences did not offer satisfactory service
("shippers must subscribe to inadequate conference service out of the Great Lakes in
order to get needed contract rates from Atlantic and Gulf ports') and explicitly left it
open for the conferences to return for permission at a later date when they "extend fuller
service to the Great Lakes." 8 F.M.C. at 44.
109 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1964). On predatory practices, see generally FMB v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 356 U.S. 481, 488-93 (1958); CELLER ComrsTrE REPORT at 8-11.
110 House CoMMa. ON THE MERCHANT MARINE AND FisHnRs, STEAMSHIP AGREEFNTS &
AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN & DoMESTc TRADES, H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1914), cited in Dodds, Legality of Shipper Tying Arrangements in
Ocean Commerce, 23 U. Pirr. L. REv. 933, 941 (1962).
111 FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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provisions outlawing predatory practices has not been extensive or
notable. However, shippers have occasionally entered claims under
the specific prohibitions in section 14 fourth against "unfair or un-
justly discriminatory" contracts based on volume and unfair treat-
ment with respect to cargo space accommodations. But these claims
have normally been combined with or subordinated to allegations
based on the much broader shipper-protection language of sections 16
and 17.112
4. Tariff filing provisions."13 All ocean carriers must keep their
tariffs open for public inspection and file them with the Federal
Maritime Commission. Tariffs must show all classifications and rates
and charges for transport to and from every port which the carrier
or conference serves. Conferences, by special Commission rule, may
file a single tariff for all of their members. If any conference rule or
regulation affects or determines in part or in whole the aggregate rates
or charges, it too must be shown, along with copies of any documents
evidencing the transportation agreement. The only rates and charges
which need not be filed are those applicable to cargo loaded and car-
ried in bulk without mark or count and softwood lumber in the
primary stages of manufacture. Tariffs must be made available to the
public at reasonable cost.
Tariff changes of any kind resulting in an increase in cost to the
shipper, as well as any new or initial rate, may not become effective
until the expiration of 30 days after publication and filing with the
Commission. Where "good cause" is shown, however, the Commission
may permit new or increased rates to become effective at an earlier
date. Tariff changes resulting in decreased cost to the shipper are
effective immediately after publication and filing with the Commission.
In order to assure that the published and filed tariffs reflect reality,
the law explicitly forbids charging, demanding, collecting, or receiving
more or less for transportation or related services than the amount
specified in the tariffs filed with the Commission and in effect at the
time. Carriers may not rebate, refund, or remit "in any manner or
by any device any portion of the rates or charges so specified, nor
extend or deny any person any privilege or facility, except in accor-
dance with such tariffs."" 4 Civil penalities for the violation of this
112 See, e.g., Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607 (1966); Grace Line, Inc. v. Skips A/S Viking
Line, 7 F.M.C. 432 (1962); Consolo v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana S.A., 5 F.M.B. 633
(1959); In re Agreement No. 6870, 3 F.M.B. 227 (1950); Neuss, Hesslein and Co. v. Grace
Line, Inc., 2 U.S.M.C. 3 (1939).
113 46 U.S.C. § 817(b) (1964).
114 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3) (1964).
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provision, as well as all other parts of section 18(b), are fixed at $1,000
per day for the duration of the offense.
The tariff filing provisions also empower the Commission to pre-
scribe the form and manner of publication and filing and to reject
filings not in conformity with the law or the Commission's regula-
tions. Those rejected are declared void and their use unlawful. Pur-
suant to this authorization, the Commission has promulgated detailed
rules to govern everything from the width of margins on tariff pages
to the labeling of commodity rates and classifications and the manner
in which they must be shown. It is obviously an extreme effort at
standardization both for its own sake and in order to prevent circum-
vention of the ameliorative and informative purposes of the law.
5. The Commission's limited powers over ratemaking. Sections 16
and 17115 of the Shipping Act are explicit exporter-importer and port
protection statutes aimed at abuses of conference market power. The
former outlaws any form of ratemaking which unduly or unreasonably
prefers one exporter or importer, locality, or classification of freight
over another; the latter outlaws unjust discrimination between ship-
pers and ports and rates "unjustly prejudicial to American exporters
as compared with their foreign competitors." These sections are largely
overlapping and most litigants allege violations of both in contesting
rates before the Commission. In any event, it would be difficult to
imagine an unduly preferential rate which is not also unjustly dis-
criminatory or prejudicial, and the Commission has not attempted
to articulate operative distinctions either between "preferences" and
"discriminations" per se or between the "undue," the "unreasonable,"
and the "unjust."
Nevertheless, in spite of the conceptual confusion, these sections
confer somewhat different powers on the Commission. Of these differ-
ences, the most important concerns Commission powers. Section 16,
as originally worded, merely declared undue preferences illegal, back-
ing up this prohibition as well as others against false billing, false
classifications, false weighing, etc., by a criminal fine of not more
than $5,000 for each offense. This section conferred upon the Com-
mission's predecessors no remedial power over rates. Conversely, from
its inception, section 17 conferred upon the United States Shipping
Board and its successors the power to "alter" rates found to be un-
justly discriminatory "to the extent necessary to correct such unjust
discrimination or prejudice," and to order the offending carrier to
115 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1964) and 46 U.S.C. § 816 (1964), respectively.
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cease and desist from charging or collecting the rate or fare in ques-
tion. In 1961, section 16 was amended to permit a state governor to
protest to the newly created Commission any conference"0 rate or
regulation on the ground that it "unjustly discriminates" against his
state, and to permit the Commission to take remedial action. The Com-
mission was empowered to order the conference to show cause why
the rate of regulation should not be "set aside"; moreover, by acting
within the 180-day limit prescribed for such proceedings, 117 the Com-
mission may "set aside" any rate or rule that it finds to be unjustly
discriminatory.
The difference between "set aside" and "alter," the operative lan-
guage of sections 16 and 17, respectively, could be substantial. The
former leaves the setting of the ultimate rate to the conference, sub-
ject of course to a new FMC veto; the latter gives the Commission
what seems to be the power to set the rate. The same distinction is
relevant to another important provision of the Shipping Act, section
18(b)(5),11 which empowers the Commission to "disapprove" rates
and charges of carriers and conferences in foreign commerce which
"it finds to be so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to
the commerce of the United States." It is noteworthy that, like sec-
tion 16, its operative language confers no remedial powers on the
Commission. The offending rate under section 18(b)(5) may be "dis-
approved," not "altered." But, again, as in the case of the preceding
statutory provisions, what reported litigation there has been involving
section 18(b)(5) to date has not been exclusively restricted to this
part of the statute. Rather, sections 14 fourth, 15, 16, 17, and 18(b)(5)
have been pleaded in conjunction whenever possibleg 9-- an easily
appreciated practice, since, as we have earlier pointed out, what is
detrimental to commerce can usually be proven unjustly discrimina-
tory, if not unduly preferential or prejudicial, with respect to some
interest or another.
116 The section allows the governors to protest only against conference rates; rates, if
set by individual carriers, could not be protested in this manner no matter how significant
they might be to the state's commerce.
117 This 180-day limitation on the Commission's typically protracted proceedings ap-
pears to be the only contribution of the "Governors' clause." Presumably, governors will
protest on behalf of ports or important shipper interests within their jurisdiction. How-
ever, both had standing under sections 16 and 17 prior to their amendment in 1961, and
the Governors' clause does not materially increase their leverage on the Commission.
118 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1964).
119 See, e.g., Imposition of Surcharge on Cargo to Manila, 8 F.M.C. 395 (1965); Grace
Line, Inc. v. Skips A/S Viking Line, 7 F.M.C. 432 (1962); and Raymond International,
Inc. v. Venezuelan Line, 6 F.M.B. 189 (1961). This practice began well before the enact-
-ment of section 18(b)(5). See, e.g., Edmund Well, Inc. v. Italian Line, "Italia," 1 US.SB.
395 (1935).
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Yet, in view of the Commission's doctrine that it may disapprove
conference agreements under section 15 if it finds that the conference
is fixing rates detrimental to the commerce of the United States or
in violation of the other three standards mentioned in that section,
it is not at all clear how much sections 16, 17, and 18(b)(5) add to
the Commission's power over ratemaking. While this doctrine has
never been invoked, largely because it has always been considered
too draconian, the Commission has, in one notable case, taken action
closely similar in outcome. 120 In this instance, a single member of the
Far East Conference was ordered to cease and desist from assessing
a surcharge on newsprint cargoes moving from Searsport, Maine, to
Manila. For a variety of complex reasons the carrier did not comply
and the United States district court refused to order compliance. Sub-
sequently, the Commission ordered the Far East Conference to show
cause why the port of Searsport should not be stricken from its juris-
diction-action analogous to dissolving the conference with respect
to the carriage of cargoes emanating from Searsport. Upon entering
the appropriate section 15 findings of unjust discrimination, detri-
ment to commerce, etc., the Commission chose not to modify or
cancel the basic agreement with respect to Searsport, ordering instead
that the rate on newsprint at Searsport be opened; that is, it required
the conference members to set rates individually on newsprint moving
to Manila from Searsport, thereby withdrawing from the conference
jurisdiction over this commodity-port combination.
While the Searsport case is the only example of such agency action
against the conference agreement itself to rectify ratemaking practices
considered illegal, such an action under section 15 appears hallowed
by a long procession of obiter dicta in Commission and court opinions
since at least as early as 1935.121 In view of the extremely broad lan-
guage of section 15, which fixes the standards under which the Com-
mission is empowered to disapprove proposed or existing conferences,
it would indeed be difficult to make a case to the contrary. The conclu-
sion which emerges, however, is curious, but entirely plausible: with
120 Imposition of Surcharge by the Far East Conference at Searsport, Maine, 9 F.M.C.
129 (1965). While the Calcutta, East Coast of India and East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference
case, FMC No. 67-33 (Sept. 14, 1967), in which the Commission invoked the lan-
guage of section 15 to disapprove the existing Calcutta Conference Agreement, appears
relevant in this respect, it is inapposite. The Commission's action was based not on any
finding of detrimental ratemaking, but rather on the recalcitrance of certain conference
members who refused to produce documents and records in response to subpoenas duces
tecum. See text at notes 158-63 infra.
121 See Edmund Weil, Inc. v. Italian Line "Italia", 1 U.SS.B. 395 (1935). More recent
expressions of this claim are to be found in the Iron and Steel, infra note 166, and High
Pressure Boiler, infra note 182, rate disparities investigations.
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respect to its power to curb abuses in conference ratemaking, the
additional authority conferred upon the Commission by section 16,
17, and 18(b)(5) is largely redundant.
6. Summary: (a) the law and the national interest. The multi-
farious provisions of the Shipping Law just reviewed are tightly bound
together by a consistent thread of deliberate national policy. Some
provisions stem from the congressional belief that the explicit
proscription of specific kinds of conduct will protect exporters and
importers from exploitation by steamship conferences. Others reflect
the belief that exporters and importers can adequately protect them-
selves if they are given the requisite information and are protected
from a variety of legal and economic restraints on their freedom. And
still others, some of these being the most important provisions of all,
quite clearly reflect the legislative view that the long run promotion
and protection of American commercial interests ultimately depends
upon the preservation of some minimum amount of competition
within the context of the conference system. The law, in language
and spirit, is intended as a shipper-protection statute. It identifies
the national interest in the sphere of ocean shipping with the interests
of the nation's merchants engaged in the foreign trades. Only upon
its effectiveness in protecting these interests may American shipping
law and policy be evaluated.
(b) The statutory scheme: indirect and direct rate regulation. Con-
gress has created a peculiarly American brand of international cartel
in the steamship conference "approved" by the Shipping Act and ex-
empted from the United States antitrust laws. As designed by Con-
gress, this cartel must allow free entry and exit to all carriers and is
obliged to police itself so as to prevent rate competition among its
members which might result in unequal treatment for shippers. It
has an obligation to hear the requests and complaints of its customers,
and must disclose its membership, agreements, rules and regulations,
and activities to a public agency. The "American" conference has no
secrets. Indeed, if the most recent interpretations of section 15 of
the Act were to be developed fully, the American conference would
be required literally to justify its every anti-competitive action in terms
of the "public interest." Moreover, all exclusionary tactics or devices,
save one, the dual-rate contract, are forbidden to it; and even this
device must take a form explicitly designed by Congress. The con-
tract may be used to bind contracting exporters and importers to
conference services in exchange for discriminatory rate concessions,
but the extent of these concessions is limited, certain provisions in-
tended to protect contracting shippers against exploitation are man-
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datory, and penalties against exporters and importers for breach are
forbidden.
In many instances, it is likely that the foregoing constraints on con-
ference organization and operation materially strengthen the bargain-
ing position of American exporters and importers and weaken that
of the conferences in the on-going process of negotiation through
which all carrier rates of any significance are established. The most
obvious example, of course, is the statutory requirement of open
conference membership which impedes restriction on liner shipping
capacity in any given trade. In this sense, it is proper to characterize
sections 14, 14b, and 15 as the principal components of a statutory
scheme of indirect rate regulation. To the extent that they are strictly
enforced, it is difficult to perceive how conferences could effectively
restrict the supply of liner service and elevate their prices for most
exporters and importers significantly above levels which, at least in
theory, would be expected to prevail in similarly structured, but more
competitively organized ocean liner markets. 1 22 And, conversely, the
strict enforcement of sections 14, 14b, and 15 must perforce help to
maximize the market power of the American exporter and importer
by increasing his elasticity of demand for conference services. We dis-
cuss these effects of the statute-most of which are seldom recognized
or understood-in Section III of this article, where we focus on the
benefits and advantages to the national interest to be gained by an
aggressive policy of "indirect rate regulation."
By contrast with the statutory provisions generally acting upon
conference organization and activities, sections 16, 17, and 18(b)(5),
which are expressly concerned with rate discrimination and rate
levels, comprise the elements of a program of direct rate regulation.
This is their obvious intent, and if enforced to the letter, their
obvious impact. The enforcement of sections 16 and 17 requires that
the Commission distinguish the merely discriminatory or merely pref-
erential rate from one which is unreasonably or unduly discriminatory
or preferential. A similar problem inheres in section 18(b)(5) which
proscribes only those rates which are "so unreasonably high or low
as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States," and not
merely those rates which, by one standard or another, appear high
or low.
Increased direct rate regulation under these sections of the statute
is what is normally called for by the periodic demands upon the Fed-
122 Even absent conferences, ratemaking in liner shipping would not be cost related,
as in the model of perfect or pure competition, given the presence of tightly oligopolistic
market structures on each trade route.
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eral Maritime Commission that it "do something about steamship
conferences," and this is the area of Commission activity which has
created the greatest controversy within the industry and the only
serious opposition from foreign governments to American efforts to
regulate international shipping. In the following section of this arti-
cle we examine the leading cases in which the Federal Maritime
Commission has attempted directly to influence the level of a broad
group of freight rates by wide-ranging investigative proceedings aimed
at determining their reasonableness. We shall then assess the regula-
tory doctrine which the Commission has evolved and its results to
date, and thereupon evaluate the costs and benefits of rate regulation,
both direct and indirect, under the Shipping Act.
II. DIRECT RATE REGULATION
Sections 16, 17, and 18(b)(5) 123 empower the Federal Maritime Com-
mission to regulate the ratemaking practices of approved steamship
conferences to prevent their members from abusing whatever incre-
mental market power they may obtain from eliminating overt rate
competition among themselves. 12 4 The objects of protection are ex-
porters and importers, ports and, to a lesser extent, independent
carriers, whose continued, albeit marginal, existence has tradition-
ally been thought desirable, despite their frequent and derogatory
characterization as rate-cutting, fly-by-night, foreign-flag lines in con-
gressional hearings, reports, and debates.125 The abuses proscribed
are undue, unjust, or unreasonable preferences and discrimination
-in rates and unreasonably high or low rate levels; ordinary "profiteer-
ing" and run-of-the-mill, preferential, or discriminatory ratemaking
were not to be curtailed as long as conferences treated similarly sit-
uated shippers and ports alike.
12 6
123 Sections 14 fourth and 15 have similar objectives. However, neither is aimed pri-
marily at rate levels per se, and neither contains language empowering the Commission
to engage in direct rate regulations.
124 It should be stressed that the principal source of market power possessed by the
liner firms which are active in American foreign trades is the tightly oligopolistic firm
structure of the industry on nearly every trade route. Membership in steamship
conferences furnishes only a highly variable increment to this market power by increasing
the availability of otherwise elusive or unobtainable information and lowering the cost
of obtaining it, by enabling the lines to present a united front (at least superficially) in
bargaining with oligopsonistic exporters and importers, and by furnishing an organized
forum for inter-carrier bargaining and for collective policing of the oligopoly price struc-
ture and price levels ultimately resulting from negotiation.
125 See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE LEGIsLATIvE HIsTORy
OF .THE STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE/DuAL RATE LAw, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962) and S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961), to accompany H.R. 6775, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1961), reported in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3109-10, 3129.
126 For a contemporary and characteristic statement of the scope of the Act, see
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With the exception of section 18(b)(5), these provisions have always
been enforced through rate-by-rate and shipper-by-shipper adjudica-
tive proceedings. Typically, cases have arisen when an exporter or
importer or port has complained of a rate or practice favoring a com-
petitor or diverting cargo movement, as the case may be. The Com-
mission's task is to determine whether, within the context of the ex-
traordinarily differentiated and highly discriminatory steamship or
terminal tariffs which are normally in question, an unreasonable dif-
ferentiation between commodities or shippers or an unreasonable dis-
crimination of any other kind has been made. The task may be easy
where only similarly situated, economically undifferentiated exporters
or importers of the same cargo, or users of the same terminal, are in-
volved,127 but somewhat more difficult where similarities between the
ports or parties in question are few, arguable, or nonexistent, and ra-
tional value-of-service or competitive considerations are involved.12 In
general, the FMC has operated as a strictly adjudicatory body in these
kinds of cases and has established a collection of "common law"
precedents which it may or may not follow from case to case.129 Lack-
ing the power to fix rates in the foreign trades on a standard of a
reasonable minimum or maximum rate of return on carrier invest-
ment, the Commission's remedies have been limited to awards of
damages, cease and desist orders, and other ad hoc remedies.130 It
is not self-evident that any particular body of expertise or any long
Hearings on Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments Before
the Subcomm. on Federal Procurement and Regulation of the Joint Economic Comm.,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 353-9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Douglas Hearings I1]
(statement of John Harllee, Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission) and Lake Charles
Harbor and Terminal District v. Port of Beaumont Navigation District, FMC No. 68-3
at 6 n.3 (April 24, 1969) (opinion of the Commission).
12 E.g., Hellenic Lines, Ltd.-Violation of sections 16 first and 17, 7 F.M.C. 673
(1964). For this purpose, the "competitive relationship" doctrine has been evolved. It
holds that for unequal treatment to be found illegal, the shippers treated unequally
must be in a competitive relationship. See, e.g., Nickey Bros., Inc. v. Associated Steam-
ship Lines, 5 F.M.B. 467, 477-9 (1958); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Marine Ter-
minals Corp., 9 F.M.C. 77, 83-84 (1965), aff'd sub nom. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. FMC, 371 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1966), revsd and remanded, 590 U.S. 261 (1968).
128 See Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District, supra note 126 at 7; Investigation
of Overland and OCP Rates and Absorption, FMC No. 65-31 at 41-45 (Feb. 24, 1969)
(opinion of the Commission).
129 E.g., compare Reduced Rates on Machinery and Tractors from United States At-
lantic Ports to Puerto Rico, 9 F.M.C. 465 (1966), 10 F.M.C. 248 (1967) and Investigation
of Free Time Practices-Port of San Diego, 9 F.M.C. 525 (1966) with Investigation of
Overland and OCP Rates and Absorption, supra note 128, and Lake Charles Harbor and
Terminal District, supra note 126. See also the Supreme Court's catalogue of Commission
decisions taking inconsistent positions under sections 16 and 17, Volkswagenwerk, supra
note 127, 390 U.S. at 278-82.
130 See, eg., Imposition of Surcharge by the Far East Conference at Searsport, Maine,
9 F.M.C. 129 (1965).
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run accretion of experience with the maritime industry is necessary
for the accomplishment of this task; nor has FMC decision making
in this area been any more or less consistent and predictable than
those typically reached by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, or similar agencies, and by the courts upon
review of the actions of these agencies. 131
The direct impact of the Commission's isolated rate cases under
sections 16 and 17 on the level of ocean freight rates has been imper-
ceptible. Only the miniscule number of exporters and importers who
have succeeded in the extended administrative and judicial proceed-
ings involved have directly benefited thereby.132 Nevertheless, the
potential of sections 16 and 17 for costly litigation may have an in-
direct impact on rate levels by strengthening the bargaining position
of carriers against shippers who seek individually tailored rate con-
cessions. We shall return below to assess the impact of these two stat-
utory provisions on ratemaking and the role of the FMC in enforcing
them. Our focus here is upon direct rate regulation conducted by
the FMC under section 18(b)(5).
A. The Five Major 18(b)(5) Investigations.
In contrast to individual rate-by-rate, shipper-by-shipper adjudi-
cations under sections 16 and 17, the Commission has relied primar-
ily upon section 18(b)(5) in its attempts to regulate the overall level
of groups of rates or of entire tariffs. At this writing there have been
only five 18(b)(5) proceedings of any significance to reach the stage
of final disposition by the Commission. Two of them were initiated
in response to private complaints filed with the Commission by a
carrier and a shipper, respectively. The other three were initiated
sua sponte by the Commission to determine if freight rates were re-
tarding American exports and, if so, to require that they be lowered.
Had the Commission ever reached the merits of the former two cases,
which, in fact, it did not, it would merely have resolved what were
essentially private disputes. Only in the latter three cases did the
Commission make an attempt at prospective regulation on a broad
scale. We shall, nevertheless, treat all five of these proceedings to-
gether because they raise common 18(b)(5) issues, such as what is an
"unreasonably high or low" rate or what economic data or phenom-
ena will be accepted as proof of "detriment to commerce."
1. The Hong Kong Inbound Investigation. The first of the two
131 See generally H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDmAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962).
132 But this has rarely been accomplished without expensive and time consuming litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Consolo v. FMC, supra note 112, and cases cited therein.
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more or less private disputes was the Investigation of Rates in the
Hong Kong-United States Atlantic and Gulf Trade. 33 It was also the
first case ever- to be brought under section 18(b)(5). In retrospect, the
Commission's proceedings constituted but the tip of an immense ice-
berg of antitrust litigation between the then bankrupt Sabre Line
and the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf and the New York Freight Bureau
(Hong Kong) Conference, which served the inbound trade between
Japan and Hong Kong and the East and Gulf Coast ports of the
United States. The dispute arose during a rate war between the mem-
ber lines of the New York Freight Bureau and a group of independent
carriers among which the Sabre Line was of some significance. After
an especially severe round of rate cutting during which the confer-
ence lowered its rates "to the levels quoted by the non-conference
lines, due account being taken of the rebates being paid by such car-
riers,"' 34 Sabre Line filed a "telegraphic protest" with the Commis-
sion alleging that the rates in the trade had become "unreasonably
low and detrimental to the commerce of the United States."' 35 The
foregoing was, of course, a paraphrase of the language of section
18(b)(5), and roughly a month later, on December 10, 1962, the Com-
mission instituted its only investigation to date into freight rates al-
leged to be "unreasonably low."
Approximately four and a half years later the presiding hearing
examiner filed his initial decision finding the rates in dispute illegal
on the grounds that they were noncompensatory of the "direct costs"
incurred in serving the port of Hong Kong and lifting the cargoes
in question and that, by instituting such unduly low, "predatory"
rates, the conference had "forced [Sabre] out of the trade."'3 6 The
proceedings before the Commission were protracted, and the delays
were compounded by extensive litigation in the federal courts over
the enforceability of a battery of subpoenas duces tecum.' 3 7 Several
months before the examiner's decision, Sabre Line instituted an anti-
133 FMC No. 1083 (Nov. 3, 1967) (opinion of the Commission) [hereinafter cited as
Hong Kong Inbound Investigation].
134 This is the language of the Conference minutes filed with the Commission, covering
its meeting of Nov. 1, 1962, when a particularly sharp rate cut was made. The Commission
described the Conference's action as a reduction "to a level several dollars below Sabre's
rates and approaching the lowest of the published independent rates." Hong Kong In-
bound Investigation at 5.
135 Id.
136 Investigation of Rates in the Hong Kong-United States Atlantic and Gulf Trade,
FMC No. 1083 at 19 (April 20, 1967) (initial decision of the hearing examiner) [herein-
after cited as Init. Dec.].
137 FMC v. Caragher, 243 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), af'd and rev'd in part, 364
F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1966).
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trust action seeking more than $45 million in treble damages from
the carriers which had participated in the rate war. The principal
theory of the complaint was that the conference agreements and the
rate actions taken under them during the rate war lost their section
15 exemption from the antitrust laws because the rates filed under
them violated section 18(b)(5). 13"
In view of Sabre Line's antitrust action, it became of no little
consequence whether the Commission affirmed or reversed the hearing
examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission
did neither. So far as it was concerned, the case was moot: five years
had passed since the rate war which had occasioned the investigations;
the economic evidence was "outdated"; the trade had "long since
regained an element of stability"; and, finally, no "useful purpose"'
would be served by the Commission's examining "a carrier's now
defunct rate structure." 13 9 Thus, its own egregious administrative
delay14 and the respondents' employment of what the hearing exam-
iner characterized as a "complete manual of dilatory procedures," 141
became the Commission's justification for avoiding a final resolution
of the 18(b)(5) issues.142 Sabre Line, however, relying heavily upon
138 Complaint at 14, Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines Ltd., 66 Civil
No. 3617 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Another ground was that the crucial rate reductions in the
inbound Hong Kong trade made by the New York Freight Bureau (Hong Kong) on Nov.
9, 1962 were agreed upon during a meeting of the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Conference,
whose membership was identical with that of the New York Freight Bureau, and thus
these rate reductions were illegal under section 15 of the Shipping Act, since the Japan-
Atlantic and Gulf Conference had no power to fix rates in the Hong Kong trade.
139 Hong Kong Inbound Investigation at 7.
140 The Commission's Order of Investigation was issued on Dec. 10, 1962. Commission
counsel did not serve the subpoenas duces tecum in question until Sept. 3, 1963. Not until
April 21, 1964, were respondents faced with the choice of producing the documents called
for or formally refusing to do so at a hearing. On June 2, 1964, the hearing examiner
referred the respondents' refusals to produce to the Commission for action. The Commis-
sion waited almost a year, until May 19, 1965, to apply to the courts for an order com-
pelling compliance with the subpoenas. FMC v. Caragher, supra note 137, 364 F.2d at 709,
712-3. Curiously, the same court of appeals which related the above chronology required
six months after oral argument to render a decision. An additional year passed after the
subpoenas were enforced before the Commission itself finally decided the case (Nov. 3,
1967).
141 Init. Dec. at 24 n.29.
142 The Commission's language is worthy of note:
Because of the protracted delay, due in large measure to the necessity for sub-
poena enforcement proceedings in the courts, we conclude that the investigation
should be discontinued on the ground that it has become moot.
• . . [S]ome useful purpose must be served before the Commission will under-
take to examine a carrier's now-defunct rate structure. Similarly, the Commission
will not consider outdated economic evidence upon which the findings of un-
reasonableness and detriment to commerce must be based.
Hong Kong Inbound Investigation at 7.
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the opinion of the hearing examiner, has continued to press its ac-
tion in the courts. 143
For our purposes, the Hong Kong Inbound Investigation was not
entirely futile. What it had commenced as an adjudication, the Com-
mission concluded as a quasi-rulemaking proceeding designed to es-
tablish criteria for applying section 18(b)(5) to future instances
wherein rates are challenged as "unreasonably low." In brief, the
Commission produced two rules. The first is that "a rate which fails
to meet [the] out-of-pocket costs of the carrier quoting the rate is
unreasonably low." Out-of-pocket costs are defined as cargo handling
expenses "plus any directly assignable costs such as brokerage, etc." 144
By their nature, these costs are necessarily associated exclusively with
the carriage of a specific shipment-a point which the Commission
appeared to stress by repetition in subsequent sentences-rather than
with the provision of service to a particular port. Having thus defined
and delimited the content of its cost criterion, the Commission had
nothing further to say on the subject. It did not explain why the
examiner's reliance upon "direct costs" was improper either as a
general rule or in the particular case in hand; nor did it explain
why, if calculations of "direct costs" similar to those utilizdd by the
examiner were necessary and proper in measuring the extent of un-
duly prejudicial or unjustly discriminatory rates under sections 16
and 17,145 the same calculations should be totally ignored in measur-
ing the reasonableness of rates under section 18(b)(5).
The Commission's second rule is a rule of procedure designed ex-
plicitly to solve the "problem" of "how a complaining carrier would
establish the out-of-pocket costs of his competitor." The Commission's
solution was to provide that:
a carrier may, by proving his own out-of-pocket costs, establish
a rebuttable presumption of the out-of-pocket costs prevailing
generally in the trade. Secondly, a carrier may show detriment
to commerce by proof of some measurable adverse economic
impact [upon] itself. In establishing these standards, we hope-
fully have avoided the pitfalls of protracted litigation which
143 See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.).N.Y.
1968), denying motions of certain defendants to dismiss, motions to stay pending final
resolution of 18(b)(5) issues by the FMC, and motions for summary judgment; Japan
Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969) and Sabre Shipping Corp.
v. American President Lines, Ltd., 1969 Trade Cas. 86517 (S.D.N.Y.), denying motions
by certain defendants for summary judgment and overruling defendants' objections to
interrogatories.
144 Hong Kong Inbound Investigation at 8.
145 See, e.g., Absorption or Equalization of Inland Freight Charges in Connection with
Transportation by Water of Explosives, 6 F.M.B. 138, 144-7 (1960).
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were demonstrated in this proceeding. This procedure should
also place the burdens of proving facts upon those persons most
capable and most readily able to prove such facts.
1 46
The carrier whose rate has been challenged in the foregoing manner
must "rebut the presumption created by showing that his actual out-
of-pocket costs and other rate factors vary materially from those de-
veloped by the complaining carrier,' 47 or by disproving the "adverse
economic impact upon itself" alleged by the complaining carrier. If
he fails, his rate is disapproved.
Both rulings could have a significant impact on future direct rate
regulation under section 18(b)(5). At this point, however, we will
discuss only the one relating to the use of "out-of-pocket" costs to
establish the reasonable minimum rate. Owing to its position at the
core of the present Commission regulatory policy, the latter ruling,
with its reliance upon comparative economic data and rebuttable
presumptions, is best examined after our review of all of the Com-
mission's section 18(b)(5) decisions has been completed.
In terms of its impact upon the scope and force of the section
18(b)(5) prohibition of unreasonably low rates, the importance of
the Commission's Hong Kong decision cannot be overstated. While
the Commission never explicitly said as much, it could not have de-
termined that recovery vel non of out-of-pocket costs was henceforth
to be the criterion of the reasonable minimum rate without rejecting
the examiner's "direct costs" criterion as well as his findings based
thereon. The examiner's formulation of "direct costs" which must
be recovered, if a rate is to survive an 18(b)(5) challenge, included
all the expenses of deviating a voyage to and spending time in the
port of Hong Kong, (amortization of capital, interest, voyage vessel
operating costs, etc.), plus the out-of-pocket costs associated with so-
liciting and handling the particular cargoes carried from Hong Kong.
While apparently recognizing that ratemaking on such a basis would
depart not only from the so-called "incremental ton approach" pre-
vailing throughout the industry but also from the most fundamental
principles of transport pricing, 48 the examiner nonetheless reasoned
that, since the cargoes affected by the rate war amounted to over 70
per cent of the carriers' total Hong Kong liftings, it was proper to
conclude that the carriers "deviated" their voyages to the port of Hong
Kong explicitly to take on these cargoes. Thus, all costs of sailing to
146 Hong Kong Inbound Investigation at 9.
147 Id. at 8-9.
148 See generally D. LocELIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION ch. 8 (6th ed. 1966); J. R.
MEYER, ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES Ch. 9 (1959); D. PE-
GRUM, TRANSPORTATION: ECONOMICS AND PUBLC POLICY ch. 8 (rev. ed. 1968).
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and from and berthing in Hong Kong, and not merely out-of-pocket
expenses related to the tonnage lifted, should have been recovered
by the rates assessed on these Hong Kong cargoes. Otherwise, the
carriers were worse off for calling at Hong Kong, having incurred in
reality an out-of-pocket loss on their Hong Kong service. Since these
direct costs of serving Hong Kong, when divided by the average ton-
nage carried per sailing, amounted to $27.68 per ton, and the weighted
average of the conference rates at their nadir in December, 1962
came to $19.95 per ton, it naturally followed that the rates challenged
by Sabre Line were noncompensatory and, consequently, unreasonably
low. 149 By comparison, out-of-pocket costs taken alone amounted to
much less than $18.00 per ton, the lowest conference rate of relevance
in the proceeding; accordingly, if only out-of-pocket costs must be
recovered to qualify a rate as compensatory, then all of the rates in
issue were invulnerable to an 18(b)(5) attack.150 As both the record
and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties stressed this differ-
ence in outcome, there can be no doubt that in rejecting direct costs
and relying upon out-of-pocket costs alone, the Commission deliber-
ately intended to reverse the examiner. Its refusal to explicitly de-
termine the validity of Sabre Line's 18(b)(5) claims on the ground
of mootness should not be permitted to obscure the obvious purpose
and effect of the Commission's ruling.
This is the most important aspect of the decision in the Hong
Kong Inbound Investigation. For if, as appears plain, the purpose of
outlawing "unreasonably low" rates is to protect independent carriers
from predatory conference pricing,151 the Commission has gutted the
statute. The Hong Kong inbound rate war was not unusual. Seldom,
149 Init. Dec. at 9-13.
150 This is based on figures introduced by the Government. The examiner implicitly
conceded that this would have been the outcome based on an out-of-pocket cost test. Id.
at 24.
151 The legislative history of section 18(b)(5) is unusually clear and concise. After de-
letion from the House bill by the Senate Commerce Committee, the section was reinserted
into the final text of Public Law 87-346, the 1961 amendments to the Shipping Act, by
an amendment introduced by Senator Kefauver, who was the only spokesman in its
behalf. No opposition was voiced. Senator Engle, floor manager of the bill for the Com-
merce Committee, accepted the amendment, and it passed without objection. Kefauver
explained the purpose of the amendment's proscription of "unreasonably low" rates as
follows:
Under the House Bill and my amendment, cartels would be precluded from
using unreasonably low rates as a predatory device. It was such a device that led
the Supreme Court to its decision in the Isbrandtsen case, which is at the root
of the proposed legislation. The members of the west coast United States-Japan
cartel dropped rates to as low as 30% of normal in order to drive Isbrandtsen
from the trade. This, the Supreme Court said, was illegal under the Shipping
Act of 1916.
It should be outlawed in the future as well as in the past, because once all
competition is driven from a trade, rates will skyrocket.
107 CONG. Rie. 19429.
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if ever, do freight rates fall below out-of-pocket costs, even in the
fiercest, most protracted rate wars. When genuine cutthroat competi-
tion does in fact commence, however, as it did in the Hong Kong
trade in 1962, rates for all important moving commodities, while
remaining above out-of-pocket costs, do in fact often fall significantly
below "direct costs," as these were defined by the examiner. Conse-
quently, to make application of section 18(b)(5) turn on a finding
that a rate is below out-of-pocket costs, is to render the statute ir-
relevant to practically all rate war situations. This conclusion follows
directly from the nature and purpose of rate wars and the tactics of
the conferences which become engaged in them.
Rate wars are typically waged over the most important commodities,
the "core cargoes" upon which the trade principally relies. 52 The
conference does not initiate severe rate cutting 53 primarily to deter
an independent from lifting any particular one of these cargoes, but
rather to drive the independent entirely from the trade, that is, from
active service to or from a particular port or range of ports.
Accordingly, the primary tactic used is to cut rates on all of the
commodities upon which the independent's business relies to a level
below the "direct cost" (again, as defined by the examiner) of pro-
viding service to the port or ports in question, which is precisely
what the New York Freight Bureau (Hong Kong) did. It would not
have been necessary for the conference to have slashed its rates below
the out-of-pocket costs of lifting one or more of the particular cargoes
carried from Hong Kong. Instead, relying on their greater financial
152 In the instant case, these cargoes were artificial flowers, cotton goods, footwear and
toys, together constituting 70% of total cargo liftings at Hong Kong. Forty per cent of all
Hong Kong cargoes were artificial flowers. Init. Dec. at 3 (finding of fact no. 1). Similarly,
the major rate wars which have occurred in the outbound Gulf trades have centered on
cotton, naval stores, petroleum products and chemicals (including synthetic rubber and
resins); in the outbound South Atlantic trades on woodpulp, linerboard and other paper
products, naval stores, tobacco, lumber and logs, and textile wastes; and in the outbound
Pacific trades on canned goods and forest products. In each of these cases, these items
constituted 50% or more of total carryings in the trade during the rate war in question.
153 Rate cutting of the kind accurately described as a "rate war" is never launched by
an independent. The independent seeks to live quietly just below the conference rate
"umbrella," cutting rates typically by as little as 15% below conference tariffs. This is
tolerated by the conference only as long as the independent does not obtain a significant
market share. When he threatens to do so, the conference begins to lower the umbrella.
See, eg., Grace Line Inc. v. Skips A/S Viking Line, supra note 119, for a description of
a rate war conforming closely to the model given in the text. In the instant case, the
conference apparently allowed Sabre and Isbrandtsen, the leading independents, to live
under its rate umbrella, commencing a rate war only at the point where it could no
longer survive further market share attrition. Init. Dec. at 3-9. As a relatively large num-
ber of other independents with wildly erratic rates were also in the trade, the facts are
not as clear as in the Grace Line case, supra.
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strength and their possession of other services over which to spread
possible losses,'"4 the conference carriers generally act on the assump-
tion that long before they are seriously injured they can drive the
financially weaker and, typically, less diversified independent lines from
the trade by making recovery of the direct costs of serving the par-
ticular ports in question impossible over an extended period of time.155
If the examiner's findings in Hong Kong Inbound Investigation are
accurate, it was precisely at this stage that Sabre Line left the trade;
yet, to repeat, the rates prevailing at that time, even though at their
nadir, still permitted recovery of out-of-pocket costs. In sum, if the
only rate which can be found "so unreasonably low . . . as to be
detrimental to the commerce of the United States" is that rate which
lies below out-of-pocket costs, section 18(b)(5) will never protect a
Sabre Lines from predation.
2. The Ludlow Litigation. The second more or less private dis-
pute arising under section 18(b)(5) was brought to the Commission
by the Ludlow Corporation, an importer of jute and jute products
from Indian ports served by the Calcutta, East Coast of India and
Pakistan/USA Conference. In August of 1965, Ludlow filed a formal
complaint with the Commission, under section 22 of the Shipping
Act,156 protesting that a conference rate increase which would be-
come effective in October of that year would subject Ludlow to rates
so "unreasonably high ...as to be detrimental to the commerce of
the United States."' 57 The Commission instituted an investigation
154 Each of the major American-flag and Japanese-flag carriers belonging to the New
York Freight Bureau (Hong Kong) during the 1962 rate war served a minimum of three
different trades and some as many as seven. Sabre Line served only one at that time.
155 What happens in practice bears out with extraordinary fidelity the theoretical pre-
dictions of M. SHUBIK, STRATrEGY AND MARKET STR cTuRE chs. 10-12 (1959) and Telser,
Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. LAw & EcoN. 259 (1966). See Grace Line,
Inc. v. Skips A/S Viking Line, supra note 119 at 442-7, wherein the Commission's findings
of fact describe a rate war corresponding in most of its details to the generalized de-
scription we have offered. All the rates fell no lower than out-of-pocket costs (with per-
haps a few unusual exceptions). The dominant conference line commenced the rate war,
the objective was predatory, and the rates on all major commodities were cut.
156 39 Stat. 736 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 821 (1964):
Any person may file with the Federal Maritime Board a sworn complaint set-
ting forth any violation of this chapter by a common carrier by water, or other
person subject to this chapter, and asking reparation for the injury, if any, caused
thereby. The Board shall furnish a copy of the complaint to such carrier or other
person, who shall, within a reasonable time specified by the Board, satisfy the
complaint or answer it in writing. If the complaint is not satisfied the Board
shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, investigate it in such manner
and by such means, and make such order as it deems proper. The Board .. .
may direct the payment, on or before a day named, of full reparation to the com-
plainant for the injury caused by such violation.
157 Ludlow's complaint also alleged that the rate increases violated sections 15 and
14(b) of the Shipping Act in that both the Conference rate-fixing agreement and dual-
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in early October 1965,158 at which time the Hearing Examiner granted
Ludlow Corporation's application for the issuance of subpoenas duces
tecum directed to each of the conference members. At first, the sub-
poenas were limited to the production of documents located in the
United States; but, subsequently, upon Ludlow's application to the
Commission itself, additional subpoenas were issued requiring the
production of certain documents and records "wherever located." The
respondent carriers refused to comply with the subpoenas and the
Commission filed a petition in the Southern District of New York
for an order of enforcement. Whereupon there ensued three years
of litigation before the New York district court, two different courts
of appeal, and the Commission itself. While four different judicial
decisions 59 and a landmark Commission opinion 160 were ultimately
rendered, no section 18(b)(5) issues were ever decided. In fact, the
original complaint which launched the Commission investigation
eventually became lost in the shuffle and was dismissed in mid-De-
cember, 1968 on the ground that the Ludlow Corporation and the Cal-
cutta Conference had settled their differences. 161
As in the Commission's Hong Kong Inbound Investigation, atten-
tion was focused in the Ludlow case exclusively upon subpoena en-
forcement. The subpoenaed documents and records were considered
so important that the Commission went so far as to cancel the Cal-
cutta Conference agreement-the first government-decreed conference
dissolution in the history of the Shipping Act-when some of the
conference members persisted in their refusal to produce all of the
economic data demanded:
The relevance of the subpoenaed documents to the complaint
of Ludlow is now settled. The courts have held the documents
rate contract (to which Ludlow was a signatory), were being "so used as to 'operate to
the detriment of the commerce of the United States,'" FMC v. DeSmedt, 866 F.2d 464,
466-7 (2d Cir. 1966). These allegations were wholly dependent upon Ludlow's primary
section 18(b)(5) theory and had the dispute ever reached the hearing stage, would doubt-
less have been treated as redundant.
158 Ludlow Corp. v. Calcutta, East Coast of India and East Pakistan/US.A. Conference,
FMC No. 65-0.
159 Calcutta, East Coast of India and East Pakistan/U.SA. Conference v. FMC, 899
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir 1968) (setting aside the Commission's order cancelling the Calcutta
Conference agreement); FMC v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (denying
motions to hold respondents in contempt); Ludlow Corp. v. DeSmedt, 249 F. Supp. 496
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (enforcing subpoenas duces tecum), aff'd sub nom. FMC v. DeSmedt, 366
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1966).
160 Calcutta, East Coast of India and East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference, FMC No. 67-33
(Sept. 14, 1967) (opinion of the Commission).
161 The presiding examiner's order dismissing the complaint stated only that, "com-
plainant, with the concurrence of respondent, requests that the complaint herein be dis-
missed on the ground that satisfactory adjustments have been made to the tariff in ques-
tion." FMC No. 65-30 (Dec. 17, 1968).
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necessary to the proper determination of the validity of the
disputed rates under that section.... Without the information
called for by the subpoenas, we cannot discharge our duty
under section 22 of the Act to investigate all properly filed
complaints, and if we conclude that there has been a viola-
tion of the statute, to provide appropriate relief. Thus, the
failure to produce the information has prevented us from ful-
filling our statutory responsibilities.
.. [H]ere we are confronted with a situation that permits of
only one solution for it is the very integrity of the regulatory
program of this country which is at stake. Since effective super-
vision and control of respondents' concerted activities is not
possible in the present posture of the conference, the antitrust
exemption which our approval granted respondents must be
withdrawn.... We cannot do otherwise under the law and
still protect shippers . . . from the possibility of unreasonably
high rates .... 162
Within the year, the Commission had been reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia on the grounds, among others,
that the Commission possessed significantly more than "only one solu-
tion" to the problem, and that the "solution" which it did elect
failed for lack of a "nexus between the subpoena problems encountered
in the Ludlow complaint proceeding. . . and the Commission's con-
clusion that the continued life of the Conference . ..was incompat-
ible with the public interest .... ,u63
While the Ludlow proceedings failed to reach any 18(b)(5) issues
and the Commission's landmark Calcutta Conference decision was re-
versed on appeal, 6 4 the Ludlow-Calcutta Conference litigation is none-
theless entitled to an important place in our study of direct rate
regulation under section 18(b)(5). First, as the preceding extracts
from the Commission's opinion illustrate, the Commission accepted
its own and the federal judiciary's loose standards of "relevance,"
(customarily applied in discovery proceedings for purposes of sub-
poena enforcement) as synonymous with the standards which a trier
of fact must perforce apply when deciding whether certain evidence
is both necessary and sufficient to support his (or its) findings. Thus,
the Commission jumped from the conclusion that all of the cost and
revenue data subpoenaed was relevant to the 18(b)(5) dispute in hand
162 Opinion of the Commission, supra note 160, at 5, 9.
163 Calcutta, East Coast of India and East Pakistan/USA. Conference v. FMC, 399
F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
164 On remand, the Commission issued an order, dated December 17, 1968, discontin-
uing the proceeding on the ground that the original Ludlow complaint had been settled.
FMC No. 67-33, supra note 160.
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to the conclusion that without all the data subpoenaed no adjudica-
tion of that particular dispute, or any other of a similar kind, was
possible. In fact, as we shall argue below, the relative value of such
economic data to a determination of the reasonableness of a liner
freight rate is at best dubious, and at worst, nil.
Second, the Ludlow complaint proceeding illustrates the potential
dynamite in section 18(b)(5) for future shipper-carrier negotiations
over liner freight rates and, as such, for the entire ratemaking pro-
cess. If the "detriment to the commerce of the United States" pro-
scribed by section 18(b)(5) is interpreted as injury to the interests
of particular, individual exporters or importers, then negotiations
which fail to result in rate reductions for these shippers are as likely
as not to spawn section 18(b)(5) complaints and wind up as full-fledged
adversary proceedings before the FMC. Indeed, in the North Atlantic
United Kingdom Rate Disparities case,165 the Commission has already
taken major strides toward making this prospect a reality by deciding
the reasonableness of specific rates on the basis of their alleged effects
on the business and profits of particular exporters.
3. The Iron and Steel Rate Disparities Investigation. The Iron
and Steel case 166 is one of a group of rate disparities investigations
initiated by the Commission under congressional fire during late 1963
and early 1964. The opponents of steamship conferences, in general,
and of the 1961 amendments to the Shipping Act, in particular, had
vigorously argued that steamship conferences were "foreign dom-
inated" and discriminated against American exports. Their charges
were invariably documented with instances in which exports were
rated higher than allegedly identical imports moving over the same
trade route, or over other routes assumed to be comparable in terms
of distance and other cost factors. Similar evidence was adduced to
show that American exporters paid more to ship their goods to third-
country markets than did their English, German, or Japanese com-
petitors. 167
If the legislative history of the enabling act to which an agency
owes its existence may be presumed to influence its future conduct at
all, it surely might have been predicted that the new Federal Mari-
time Commission would have rushed to investigate these allegations.
165 Investigation of Ocean Rate Structures in the Trade between the United States
North Atlantic Ports and Ports in the United Kingdom and Eire, FMC No. 65-45 (August
20, 1968) (opinion of the Commission) [hereinafter referred to variously as the NAUK
Case, the NAUK Investigation, and Docket 65-45].
166 Iron and Steel Rates, Export-Import, 9 F.M.C. 180 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Iron
and Steel].
167 See, e.g., 107 CONG. REc. 19366, 19373, 19413-8 (1961).
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Yet, during its first two years of existence, the Commission did little
or nothing on the rate disparities front. In the middle of its third
year, however, and with the sudden force of a tornado, Senator Paul
H. Douglas of Illinois, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee,
burst upon the scene, and the Commission's disinclination to act was
rudely challenged:
UNITED STATES CONGRESS
The Joint Economic Committee
May 3, 1963
THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, D.C.
My Dear Mr. President: As you know, the Joint Economic
Committee has been holding hearings on the steel indus-
try....
The committee was seriously disturbed to learn of the exis-
tence of substantial discrimination against American exporters
in ocean freight rates. For example, the record shows that
freight rates on identical steel products are significantly higher
-sometimes nearly twice as high-when they are exported
than when imported. On some classes of steel products this
differential appears to be 10 per cent or more of the prices
of the products concerned. ...
Seeking a better understanding of this unfavorable situa-
tion, the committee invited the Chairman of the Federal Mari-
time Commission or his representative to testify. Testimony
by the Commission's representatives revealed what I called
in the record, "a grave dereliction of duty on the part of the
Federal Maritime Commission" in protecting the national
interest. The testimony showed that the Maritime Commission
has long been aware of the existence of discrimination against
American exporters.., but that no study had ever been made
by the Commission to determine the extent of this discrimina-
tion and its consequences for American trade. . ..
It became evident that the Maritime Commission views its
role in protecting American exporters against discrimina-
tion in freight rates as purely passive, leaving the initiative
for instigating action to private parties or to other Govern-
ment agencies ....
In a matter so vital to the national interest, Mr. President,
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it is shocking to find the Maritime Commission's lack of ini-
tiative justified, as it was yesterday, in the words: "Just the
old adage of the squeaking wheel getting the grease, Senator,
there is so little grease to go around."
Faithfully yours,
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, CHAIRMAN 16
In relatively short order, Senator Douglas succeeded in having the
incumbent Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission ousted and
replaced with a vigorous regulator, who also happened to be the
Commander of Ensign John F. Kennedy's PT boat squadron in World
War 11.169 In addition, by the application of almost constant pressure,
the Senator bludgeoned the Commission into accepting not only the
idea that the issue of rate disparities was a real one, but also the notion
that among the Commission's primary functions was direct rate regula-
tion to promote American exports. 1 0 Thus were commenced the
Commission's rate disparities investigations, of which the Iron and
Steel case was the first to reach a final disposition on the merits.
The investigation known as Iron and Steel Rates, Export-Import,
was instituted by the Commission under sections 15 and 18(b)(5) of
the Act to determine (1) whether the outbound and inbound rates
on iron and steel items assessed by the conferences and common car-
riers in the United States North Atlantic and Gulf/United Kingdom
and Continent trades and in the United States Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific trades with Japan were "so unreasonably high or low as to
be detrimental to the commerce of the United States, and (2) whether
the discrepancy between such [outbound and inbound] rates results
in unjust prejudice to exporters of the United States as compared
with their foreign competitors."'171 During the investigation, the scope
of the inquiry was expanded to include the trades between the Pacific
168 Hearings on Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments
Before the Joint Economic Comm., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 3-4 (1963) [herein-
after cited as I Douglas Committee Hearings].
169 1965 DOUGLAS CoMMITErr REPORT, supra note 1, 28; N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1963, at
84; id., Aug. 27, 1963, at 62. See also W. CARY, POLIrIcS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES
9 (1967).
170 1965 DOUGLAS COMMITTEE REPORT 28-30; see Hearings on Discriminatory Ocean
Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments Before the Subcomm. on Federal Procure-
ment and Regulation of the Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 353-9
(1965) (statement by J. Harilee, FMC Chairman) [hereinafter cited as 2 Douglas Committee
Hearings]; SUacoaMM. ON FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC
CoMM., 89TH CONG., 2D Sass., REPORT (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter referred to as 1966
DOUGLAS COMMaITrEE REPORT].
171 9 F.M.C. at 181.
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Coast and Australia, and all United States trades to and from the
Philippines.
The formulation of the issues to be investigated responded directly
to the testimony of the steel industry before the Douglas Committee
and the Committee's demands for agency action. In particular, they
reflected the view that, because published inbound liner freight rates
were significantly lower than published outbound rates on the same
or similar iron and steel products, the nation's iron and steel exports
were harmed-in sum, that freight rates could be a meaningful deter-
rent to iron and steel exports. 172 After reviewing more than 4,000
pages of testimony, 247 exhibits, and a substantial collection of doc-
uments and statistical materials, the hearing examiner, and later the
full Commission, concluded that there was no basis in fact for these
allegations and decided both of the foregoing issues in favor of the
respondent carriers and conferences.
In the first place, it was discovered that the same or similar iron
and steel products are not for the most part imported and exported;
that the nation's major exports and imports of iron and steel items
do not in fact even move in ocean liners; and that in the very few in-
stances in which the same products are imported and exported, the
great majority of these move by different modes of ocean transporta-
tion-principally in tramps and chartered vessels.
In the second place, the allegedly discriminatory rate disparities
were found to be either nonexistent or irrelevant to the competitive
position of American iron and steel exporters. With respect to Japan,
for example, the Commission found that the lower Japanese produc-
tion costs were "an almost insurmountable barrier" to American sales
in that country; that American mills have "never been competitive
in Japan in a wide range of steel commodities"; and that, "[i]n most
instances, the rates on steel from the United States to Japan have no
influence on the inability of American shippers to export."' 73 The
American disadvantage vis-4-vis the Japanese mills in the Philippine
market was much the same; although there was some evidence intro-
duced that rates from Europe and Australia were lower than compa-
rable rates from the United States to the Philippines, the Commission
found that "European and Australian mills have lost business in the
Philippines to the Japanese in about the same volume as the United
States."' 74
172 See notes 167-70, supra; see also 107 CONG. RIEc. 19366, 19413 (1961).
173 9 F.M.C. at 184-5.
174 Id. at 185.
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The findings were similar in the other trades investigated: either
the outbound rate turned out to be lower than the inbound rate or,
where there was indeed a disparity, it was irrelevant to the problems
of American exporters or beyond the power of the conferences to
correct.
On the basis of these and similar findings, the Commission held
that the existing iron and steel rates, export and import, did not vi-
olate section 18(b)(5) or any other provision of the Shipping Act. More-
over, it explicitly held the existence of rate disparities to be irrelevant
to "domestic competition with imports" and "the exporter's ability
to sell."'175 Then, characterizing American steel producers as being
"simply estopped from participating in exports," the Commission
seemed deliberately to exonerate the carriers from any responsibility
for the plight of the steel industry: "In many cases, even if the steel
were carried free, the basic American cost still would be higher than the
corresponding foreign cost." 176
Having rebuffed Senator Douglas with its findings of fact-none
of which was in the least surprising-the Commission proceeded by
frankly acknowledged obiter dicta177 to placate the Senator and si-
multaneously to defend itself from future criticism. 78 The Senator,
some of his most influential witnesses, and the Joint Economic Commit-
tee's (JEC) report had recommended that, when rate disparities were al-
leged to injure American exports, the FMC should not proceed
through lengthy adjudicatory hearings, but rather should promptly
order the carrier assessing the higher of any two presumably compa-
rable rates to justify it, under pain of disapproval under section
18(b)(5). 79 Accepting the Senator's position and the recommendation
of the JEC report, and no doubt recognizing that the announcement
of such a policy would lend it a tough "no nonsense" image, the
175 Id. at 189.
176 Id.
177 Section 18(b)(5) was added to the Shipping Act by Public Law 87-346 in 1961.
It i as not been thoroughly construed and has not been specifically applied to
many ratemaking situations, particularly in the area of inbound/outbound rate
disparities. While we find no violation of section 18(b)(5), we believe certain
comments are appropriate.
Id.
178 Senator Douglas had already announced a new set of hearings, this time to be con-
ducted by the Subcommittee on Federal Procurement and Regulation of the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee. These hearings commenced in April of 1965, three months after the
Commission's Iron and Steel opinion was rendered.
179 This in fact was the first of the Joint Economic Committee's many "recommenda-
tions" to the FMC in its report on the Douglas hearings, which had been published eleven
months before the Commission's Iron and Steel decision. 1965 DOUGLAS CoMmrrraa RE-
PORT 3, 28-29.
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Commission seized the opportunity and promulgated the following
rule:
When a rate disparity in reciprocal trades on similar com-
modities appears, and when movement of goods under the
higher rates has been impaired, the carrier quoting the rates
must demonstrate that the disparate rates are reasonable. 80
Such a demonstration may be accomplished by a showing that "the
attendant transportation circumstances require that the rate be set
at the level" challenged under section 18(b)(5) or that the difference
between the outbound and inbound rates in question is due to any
of the "myriad ratemaking factors which might differ" between the
trades, including "competition, volume of the movement, stowage.
stevedoring costs, and others."' 8'1 The promulgation of this rule, which
we shall henceforth call the "reciprocal disparities rule" or more simply,
the "Iron and Steel rule," constitutes the entirety of the Commission's
accomplishment in this celebrated litigation. We shall examine the
content and application of this rule below.
4. The Boilers Case. The Boilers Investigation "8 2 was similar to
the Iron and Steel case, except that triangular rather than reciprocal
rate disparities were primarily involved. The Commission's Order of
Investigation recited the charge that rates on utility-type boilers and
components shipped to South America, the Far East, and the Indian
subcontinent were higher from American than from English and Con-
tinental ports, and that inbound rates were lower than outbound rates
in the United States-Japanese trades. The purpose of the proceeding
was to determine whether, if these charges were true, the higher out-
bound rates from the United States violated sections 17183 or 18(b)(5)
of the Shipping Act.
As in the Iron and Steel case, the record wholly failed to support
the view that freight-rate discrimination had impaired the compet-
itive position of American boiler exporters:
While the domestic manufacturer may be confronted with
foreign competition, the record does not show that a domestic
180 9 F.M.C. at 191.
181 Id. at 191-2.
182 Outboard Rates Affecting the Exportation of High-Pressure Boilers (Utility Type),
Parts and Related Structural Components, 9 F.M.C. 441 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as
the Boilers Case or the Boilers Investigation].
183 46 U.S.C. § 816 (1964): "No common carrier by water in foreign commerce shall
demand, charge, or collect any rate ... which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers
or ports, or unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United States as compared with their
foreign competitors."
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manufacturer ever lost a sale to a foreign competitor because
of higher rates applicable in the United States foreign trades.
Neither was there any concrete evidence whatever of detriment
to the trade in utility boilers or to the commerce of the United
States in general by reason of the level, absolute or compar-
ative, of ocean freight rates.
1 8 4
Indeed, a rather contrary impression emerges from the Commission's
description of the evidence in the record. The American exporters
of utility-type boilers are a tight oligopoly of four large firms, facing
so little foreign competition in the Latin American, South Asian, and
Far Eastern markets investigated that the industry witness' 8 5 was un-
able to produce any specific data quantifying this competition or even
so much as identifying its source. Apparently, this was a high tech-
nology market in which American manufacturers had such substan-
tial cost advantages that even though Japanese firms apparently built
such boilers, and constituted the American exporters' "chief competi-
tion in the Philippines," the Commission found that American utility
boilers "are exported to Japan, notwithstanding the inherent compet-
itive disadvantage of ocean transport costs.' 86 In fact, despite a signif-
icant rate disparity in favor of the inbound movement of most boilers
and parts in the trade between the United States and Japan, "the record
show[ed] that no boiler or boiler parts have moved inbound [from
Japan] under these rates."' 87
Ratemaking, too, turned out to be very different in practice from
that which had been anticipated. In the main, the boilers in question
were used in very large power generation projects, in the construction
of which the boiler manufacturer was merely a subcontractor, who
routed his boiler cargoes and components much as directed by the
ultimate purchaser or the prime contractor for the project. In almost
every case this latter individual had negotiated special "project rates"
covering all the components of his project, including boilers and parts,
substantially lower than those published in the relevant conference
tariffs for non-project related shipments of the same cargoes. Conse-
quently, every rate applicable to the movement of boilers in each of
the trades concerned was unique and likely to differ significantly
184 9 F.M.C. at 444. The Douglas Committee had uncritically accepted the industry
trade association's bald assertions to the contrary. 1965 DouGLAs CommrrraE RErORT 19.
185 "No manufacturer, seller, or purchaser, shipper, or consignee of utility boilers
testified. General testimony concerning the product and industry was provided by a trade-
association executive, Mr. M. 0. Funk, . . . manager of the American Boiler Manufactur-
ers Association .... " 9 F.M.C. at 442-3.
186 Id. at 444.
187 Id. at 458.
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from every other which had preceded or was likely to succeed it.
Further confusion was assured by the fact that few boilers moved as a
complete unit, many being over 20-stories high when assembled. Rather,
"shop-fabricated components, parts, and materials coming under var-
ious commodity classifications are shipped in partial lots"'u8 for on-
site assembly. Often more than a year is taken in the shipping pro-
cess. Freight charges for any particular utility boiler will thus depend
upon the unique mix of components going into that boiler. Conse-
quently, a fictional construct of the "typical" boiler had to be created
for each trade and rated part by part. Apparently, the result was less
than satisfactory, for the Commission found that "the figures submitted
varied widely in the various categories to the extent that no reason-
ably comparable boilers were involved."' 89 Some figures submitted
by the manufacturers did not even contemplate the shipment of a
complete boiler but assumed that some components would be supplied
locally.
Yet, the Commission accepted the construct of the "ideal boiler" and
the accompanying "typical" list of boiler components, and analyzed the
rate disparities although the various project rates, rebates, and many
divergent rating practices rendered the published tariffs wholly irrel-
evant to the outbound trade in boilers. In each case, the Commission
found the disparities which supposedly favored foreign manufacturers
justified either by the greater distance to destination from the United
States than from Europe or by the existence of "depressed rates" in
the foreign-to-foreign trade used as a basis of comparison.1' In the
case of the lower inbound Japanese rates, the Commission disregarded
the disparity on the ground that nothing was moving inbound. These
considerations, plus the lack of evidence of injury to American ex-
porters, clearly disposed of the issues raised by the Order of Investiga-
tion.
Lest the investigation be considered a total loss, however, and
doubtless with an eye toward the second series of Douglas Committee
Hearings then under way, the Commission proceeded through delib-
erate obiter dicta, as in the Iron and Steel case, to enhance its image
as a tough regulator by shifting the burden of proof onto the car-
riers in triangular rate disparities investigations. On the theory that
"triangular rate disparities" are analogous to reciprocal rate dispar-
ities and that the legality of both may be determined on the same
principles, the Commission literally read section 17 into section 18(b)(5)
188 Id. at 445.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 454-5.
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to produce a rather complex rule which we paraphrase as follows:
Whenever the American exporter's rate exceeds his foreign compet-
itor's rate to the same destination, and there is evidence that "the
transportation conditions" in the two trades are comparable "in ma-
terial respects" and the movement of American exports has been
"impaired," the carriers must rebut the findings of comparability as
between commodities or trades or refute the evidence of "impairment"
of movement of American exports, at risk of the Commission's dis-
approval of the rates in question. 191
Although this rule would appear to constitute no more than a mere
logical extension of the reciprocal disparities rule of the Iron and Steel
case, there is a basic distinction. The Iron and Steel rule imposes a
burden of proof of reasonableness upon carriers which are, at least
presumptively, serving both of the routes being compared-both the
inbound and outbound legs of the same trade. Irrespective of whether
all other aspects of the operation of the Iron and Steel rule are fair,
and whether or not it is otherwise capable of producing defensible
results, the reciprocal disparities rule does at least reflect some rough
justice. If the inbound and outbound carriers are by and large the
same, they do have the power to remedy an allegedly harmful dis-
parity by either lowering the outbound rate or raising the inbound
rate. In contrast, the outbound carriers from the United States to
South America or India, for example, are rarely the same as the.
outbound carriers from Europe or Japan to those same destinations.
Consequently, the former carriers have no control whatsoever over
the rates charged by the latter; nor are they necessarily familiar with
the conditions which account for the latter's rates being lower than
their own. Should the outbound carriers from the United States be
unable to justify their higher rates to South America or India, their
only remedy is to lower those rates. They cannot cause an increase
in the European or Japanese rates in question, or, for that matter,
prevent the carriers in those foreign-to-foreign trades from the further
lowering their rates to protect their own shippers from the inroads
of American exporters. In view of these factors, it makes little sense
to read the Iron and Steel rule into section 17 and section 17 into
section 18(b)(5). Thus, the FMC's triangular rate disparities rule would
appear to be even more vulnerable to criticism than its reciprocal
disparities rule.
5. The Investigation of Ocean Rate Structures in the North Atlan-
tic United Kingdom Trade. The NA UK Investigation was brought
191 Id. at 458.
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under sections 15, 18(b)(5), and 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 and section
212(f) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.192 In its order assigning
the case for a hearing,19 3 the Commission specified nine issues on
which it "desire[d] the parties to present evidence and testimony and
advance arguments." Six of these concerned the structure and level
of rates in the outbound North Atlantic United Kingdom Conference
(NAUK) tariff as compared with those in the inbound North Atlan-
tic Westbound Freight Association (NAWFA) tariff. The Commis-
sion wished to determine (i) whether the outbound rate structure
was "effectively higher" than the inbound rate structure; (ii) whether
the "apparent disparate rate structure in the trade," which had been
disclosed in a much publicized study by the Commission's staff, as
well as specific disparities between inbound and outbound rates on
similar commodities, adversely affected American exports or other-
wise violated the standards of section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916;
and (iii) whether there existed any "transportation factors" which
would "explain or justify" the higher outbound rate structure or the
existence of higher outbound rates on specific commodities. The three
remaining questions were whether any individual commodity rates
should be disapproved as authorized by section 18(b)(5), whether any
recommendations should be made to Congress "to correct discrimina-
tions caused by rate disparities in this trade," and whether the con-
ference agreements of the NAUK and NAWFA lines should be
modified or disapproved pursuant to section 15.
As the foregoing catalogue of questions for investigation suggests,
the NA UK case was intended primarily as an investigation of "rate
structures"'194 as opposed to the earlier Iron and Steel and Boilers cases,
which had been concerned with specific rate levels. The theory of the
NA UK Investigation was explained by the Commission's chairman,
192 49 Stat. 1990 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1122(e) (1964). This section provides that the Com-
mission is "authorized and directed"
To investigate, under the regulatory powers transferred to it by this chapter,
any and all discriminatory rates, charges, classifications, and practices whereby
exporters and shippers of cargo originating in the United States are required by
any common carrier by water in the foreign trade of the United States to pay a
higher rate from any United States port to a foreign port than the rate charged
by such carrier on similar cargo from such foreign port to such United States
port, and recommend to Congress measures by which such discrimination may
be corrected; ....
193 Order of Investigation, FMC 65-45, S0 Fed. Reg. 15600 '(Dec. 17, 1965).
194 A "rate structure," to the extent that it constitutes a single definable concept, is
that which appears when all rates in a single tariff are taken in the aggregate: "the
overall array" or "profile" of rates in a tariff. See NAUK Investigation, supra note 165
(Jan. 31, 1968) (presiding examiner's initial deision) [hereinafter cited as Init. Dec.].
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John Harllee, seven months prior to its commencement, in testimony
before the Douglas Committee:
It is not the existence of rate disparities either selectively
or an entire disparate rate structure alone that gives one con-
cern. In all probability if there were no conference system and
each carrier, without consultation with other carriers, arrived
at his price list, there would still be selective inbound/out-
bound disparities and probably some disparity in the entire
rate structures inbound and outbound. This would, perhaps,
be tolerable. What is of concern is that two rate-setting bodies
with a substantial identity of membership may by agreement
be fixing a rate structure in one direction which is higher
than that it fixes in another direction. 195
The solution to this problem was assumed to lie in diligent in-
vestigation of the rate structures of the nation's most important trades
in which significant individual rate disparities emerged from a com-
parison of inbound and outbound tariffs. Unless the disparity between
the outbound and inbound rate structures could be justified or ex-
plained "by the normal economic forces, including price or rate com-
petition by carriers," the Commission was prepared to conclude that
the disparity was, in Chairman Harllee's terminology, "artificial" and
deliberately "discriminatory against exporters from the United States
in favor of exporters from a foreign country."'19 6
On this theory, the Commission had issued a battery of section 2 1117
orders against eight outbound and eight inbound steamship confer-
ences serving reciprocal trade routes, ordering the production of a
wide range of cost, cargo, and revenue data relating both to the car-
195 2 Douglas Committee Hearings at 356. This statement is directly responsive to the
Joint Economic Committee's formulation of the problem. The Joint Economic Commit-
tee Report spoke of the foreign domination of steamship conferences, 1965 DOUGLAS CoM-
mTTEE REPoRT 4, 13; of bloc-voting against the American-flag carriers by the more
numerous foreign-flag carriers, id. at 20; and of the total absence of justification for higher
outbound rates in the trades with Japan and Europe, id. at 13-20. Mainly by innuendo
this report leaves the overwhelming impression that American foreign commerce is beset
by secret agreements or conspiracies---chiefly among foreign steamship lines-to discrim-
inate against American exports in favor of the exports of their respective countries.
196 2 Douglas Committee Hearings at 354-5.
197 39 Stat. 736 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1964). This provision authorizes the Commission
to
require any common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter ...
to file with it . . .any periodical or special report, or any account, record, rate,
or charge, or any memorandum of any facts and transactions appertaining to the
business of such carrier or other person subject to this chapter. Such report, ac-
count, record .... or memorandum shall be under oath whenever the [Com-
mission] so requires, and shall be furnished in the form and within the time
prescribed by the [Commission].
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riers' services as a whole and to their carryings of about 100 commod-
ities "selected because of the wide freight rate disparity, actual or
potential tonnage movement, and because they were the subject of
protests by exporters or investigation by the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the Congress or the Department of Commerce."'198 The Com-
mission's orders created a considerable international flap. Acting
collectively, the 11 maritime nations most significantly affected for-
mally protested to the State Department that the FMC's demands and
threats of penalties exceeded the jurisdiction of the United States and
infringed their national sovereignty; England, France, and Germany,
among others, passed legislation forbidding compliance; and a bruising
international dispute was averted only at the last minute by negoti-
ations between the United States and 14 other maritime powers,
sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment.9 9 After nearly a year of meetings, an "Agreed Minute" was
ultimately produced governing the nature and content of the infor-
mation which the FMC might obtain with the cooperation of the 14
foreign governments, and the uses to which this information might
be put.200 Simultaneously, roughly four years of conference litigation
in the federal courts over the proper reach and scope of section 21
orders came to an end with the broadest possible judicial reading
of the Commission's powers under the statute.20 1
With the information obtained under the "Agreed Minute" and that
which the judicial enforcement of its section 21 orders within the
United States had produced, the Commission concluded that the rate
structures in the trade between United States North Atlantic ports
and those in the United Kingdom and Ireland were disparate and
discriminated severely against American exports, without being justified
or explained in terms of volume and value of cargoes or the compet-
itive conditions prevalent in the trade.20 2 This conclusion was based
on the following statistics:
198 1964 FMC ANN. REP. 11.
109 A narrative of the events referred to in the text, accompanied by excerpts from
the relevant documents, foreign statutes, and citations to related materials are compiled
in 1 CHAYES, supra note 4, at 425-50.
200 Agreed Minute on Exchange of Shipping Information, 52 DEP'T SrxA BuL. 188
(1965), reproduced in 1 CHAyrs 444-7.
201 See Far East Conference v. FMC, 337 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 991 (1965). Section 21 orders are valid and enforceable even though no complaint
proceedings are involved. "They are available to aid investigation without the need for
the support of a charge of violation of the Act or belief even that such a violation is
probable." See also Pacific Westbound Freight Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49
(9th Cir. 1964), and other cases cited therein.
202 2 Douglas Committee Hearings, pt. 2, at 417 (memorandum by the FMC), repro-
duced in 1 ClHAYs 461.
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U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-UNITED KINGDOM TRADE-LINER CARRYINGS, 1963203
Extent Percent
inbound inbound
exceeds exceeds
Outbound Inbound outbound outbound
Weight tons 518,098 550,942 32,844 6
Cargo value $464,450,419 $559,183,267 $94,732,848 20
Revenue tons 601,808 985,139 383,831 64
Revenue $21,603,446 $26,899,183 $5,295,737 25
Average revenue
per revenue ton $35.93 $27.30 -
To the Commission, this data proved that the dominant direction of
trade is inbound from the United Kingdom. Weight tons inbound
were greater by 6 per cent than weight tons outbound; total cargo
value inbound was 20 per cent greater than outbound; revenue tons
carried inbound exceeded revenue tons carried outbound by 64 per
cent; and the carrier's gross revenues were 25 per cent greater in-
bound than outbound. On the basis of this data, the outbound leg
of the trade, with its lower volume and lower aggregate cargo value,
should be viewed as the "backhaul"; thus, if credence could be given
to the received learning of transportation economics, outbound rates
in the aggregate should have been lower than inbound rates in the
aggregate, instead of vice versa. In fact, average revenue per revenue
ton in the outboard trade exceeded that in the inbound trade by about
a third.
But this was not all. Even more damning were the inferences which
the Commission drew from data respecting the 10 major commod-
ities moving in each direction in the trade:
Outbound, the average revenue per revenue ton is $38.36;
inbound, it is $28.89. Each of these average rates is higher than
the average overall revenue per revenue ton, which would tend
to refute the argument that low rates are given to outbound
commodities that actually move in volume. This comparison
also shows an apparent discrimination against U.S. exporters.
In major moving commodities, the average revenue per rev-
enue ton outbound is 33 per cent higher than the average
revenue per revenue ton inbound.204
This set of statistics, plus the finding that "the outbound tariff has
a heavier concentration of rates in the higher rate levels, and the in-
bound tariff has a heavier concentration of rates at the lower rate
203 1 CHAYEs 458.
204 Id. at 459.
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levels," 20 5 appeared to indicate systematic discrimination against Amer-
ican exporters, "by agreement . . . between two rate-setting bodies
with substantial identity of membership"-the principal evil as to
which Chairman Harllee had voiced his concern.
Accordingly, citing substantially all of these statistics, and empha-
sizing (by placement at the head of the list) its finding that "of the 12
members of the outbound conference and 11 members of the inbound
conference, 7 are common to both,"20 6 the Commission issued its De-
cember 16, 1965 Order of Investigation to which we have previously
referred. The North Atlantic United Kingdom Freight Conference
and the North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association, and all of
their member lines were named as respondents, and the presiding
examiner was explicitly ordered to place upon them the burden of
proof according to the rule announced in the Iron and Steel Investi-
gation, which had been decided only six days before.
Hearings which extended over many months were held in several
cities. The testimony of professional economists, consultants, and
academic specialists in transportation, as well as exporters and im-
porters, members of the Commission's staff, and officials of the re-
spondent carriers and several government agencies was spread over
4,955 pages of record and 178 exhibits, many of which were very
extensive. The length of the proceedings as a whole and their extra-
ordinary formlessness were due in the main to the examiner's ruling,
early in the hearings, that the Order of Investigation "required" an
inquiry into any and all outbound rates that "may violate the stan-
dards of the Shipping Act, entirely aside from any question of dis-
parity. '207 This ruling opened the entire NAUK Conference tariff-
over 1,500 individual rates and several hundred additional classifi-
cations-to challenge by the Commission's staff and disgruntled ship-
pers.
Again, as in the Iron and Steel and Boilers cases, the Commission's
findings wholly repudiated the assumptions upon which the launching
of the investigation had been based. The Commission found that the
overall rate structure, considered as a "price profile," was 25 per cent
higher outbound than inbound, but that this disparity was neither
"effective nor significant" because the "aggregate amounts paid by
shippers" were not greater in the outbound trade. The Commission
expressly agreed with its staff hearing counsel who "conceded" that:
It appears to be true that if we concentrate on yield per ton
205 Order of Investigation, FMC 65-45, 30 Fed. Reg. 15599 (Dec. 17, 1965).
206 Id.
207 Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 4.
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for the major moving commodities outbound (i.e., over 500
tons) compared to yield per ton inbound [overall commodi-
ties], there is no higher outbound disparity.20 8
Indeed, on the record as reviewed by the Commission itself,20 9 the fore-
going "concession" was much understated. The 116 heaviest moving
commodities in the outbound trade (all of which moved in volume
greater than 500 tons in 1965) were rated extraordinarily favorably,
at levels which averaged at least $10.00 below the average rate in the
inbound tariff. The average revenue per weight ton for the 25 major
moving commodities in the outbound trade (which constituted better
than 55 per cent of total outbound liftings, in terms of revenue tons)
was $29.36, while the average revenue per weight ton for the 25 leading
items inbound was $63.20, more than twice as great. Moreover, 70 of
the leading 116 commodities outbound (these 70 constituting over
65 per cent of outbound tonnage by weight tons, as opposed to revenue
tons, and nearly 60 per cent of total outbound revenue)2 10 moved at
rates below $40 per ton, or, in other words, at rates 50 per cent or more
'below the average rate fixed by the inbound conference on its 25
leading commodities. In sum, it was discovered that the very great
majority of cargoes actually moving in the outbound trade were ship-
ped under a tariff structure which was vastly more favorable than
that under which inbound cargoes of comparable importance were
moving.
This proceeding, however, unlike its two predecessors, was not to be
in vain. Applying the rate disparity rules, the Commission found
grounds for "disapproving" seven rates out of the more than 1,500
listed in the NAUK Conference tariff and opened to scrutiny by the
examiner's broad reading of the Commission's Order of Investigation.
The NAUK rates disapproved were those applicable to "General Cargo,
N.O.S.," under which about 2.5 per cent of the total conference car-
ryings moved in 1965, and "Egg Albumen," "Meat Offals," "Onions,"
"Plastic Sheeting," "Sleds," and "Toys," which collectively accounted
for another 2 per cent of total conference liftings in that year.211 The
208 NAUK Investigation at 28.
209 Id. at 14-16.
210 These figures do not appear in the Commission's opinion but are drawn from an
exhibit prepared by the NAUK Conference Office showing its 1965 carryings of items
accounting for 300 weight tons or more during the year, and from the presiding ex-
aminer's tables of total carryings and revenues, Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 39. ",
211 Calculated from the sources referred to in the preceding note. The Commission
lumped together General Cargo, N.O.S., and specific commodity N.O.S. rates treating them
erroneously as the same in origin and effect in all cases-although recognizing that they
were occasionally fixed at different levels. By so doing, it was able to conclude that N.O.S.
rates covered 10.6% of NAUK carryings in 1965.
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outbound rates for General Cargo, N.O.S., Meat Offals, Plastic Sheet-
ings, and Sleds were 32, 40, 45, and 100 per cent higher, respectively,
than their counterparts in the reciprocal trade. Similarly, the outbound
NAUK rates for Egg Albumen, Onions and Toys, were found to be 40,
45, and 75 per cent higher, respectively, than the outbound Canada/
United Kingdom or North Atlantic/Continent rates. As the Commis-
sion's Order of Investigation provided, these findings established the
first leg of the Iron and Steel rule, as amplified in the Boilers case:
the existence of rate disparities. Only "impairment of movement"
under the higher rates remained to be established in order to shift
the burden of proof of "reasonableness" to the NAUK Conference.
For evidence of impairment of movement, the Commission relied
heavily upon the testimony of the exporters affected by the rates in
question. With the exception of the evidence accepted as proof that
the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate inhibited exports, all of the exporters'
testimony was essentially the same. Each swore on the witness stand
that a lower rate would surely increase his exports to the United King-
dom. When asked what rate was required to achieve this effect and
what rate he would consider reasonable, in each case the witness would
point to a lower rate in competitive trade, Canada/United Kingdom,
for example, or in a related trade in close geographic proximity, such
as the North Atlantic Continental trade. The flavor of the testimony
may be obtained from a passage from the record apparently considered
of such significance that it was cited by the Commission, without more,
for the proposition that, "the relatively high outbound rate [on Meat
Offals] has prevented sales and a lower rate would increase the exports
of this commodity. '212 A witness for Armour & Co., one of the largest
meat packers, said:
In view of strong competition from Australia and New Zea-
land, meat packers who can produce the same products
cheaper than U. S. packers and who also enjoy lower rate of
import duties, we solemnly feel that the current ocean freight
rates from U. S. ports to the United Kingdom on frozen vari-
ety meats should be reduced to the level of the rates to conti-
nental ports.
The rates to U.K. are about three quarter cent per pound
higher than to the continent and our Sales Department has
many times advised that they could not sell in U.K. as our
delivered price was one quarter cent or one half cent per
pound higher than buyers were willing to pay. This would
indicate if U.K. rates were at the same level as continental
212 NAUK Investigation at 21.
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rates, our quotations would many times result in sales that
we cannot make under existing rates.213
A variation on this theme was the argument that the exporter and his
entire industry (e.g., Onions, Toys) were losing business to Canadian
exporters or other American exporters routing their cargoes through
Canada-it was never quite clear which-and that parity with Cana-
dian rates was essential. In the case of each of the commodities in
question, with the exception of Meat Offals, evidence was introduced
that exports to the United Kindom through North Atlantic gateways or
from the United States at large-again, the record was never clear-
were declining. On the basis of this kind of evidence and nothing more,
the Commission concluded that the second leg of the rate disparities rule
had been established: The rates for Egg Albumen, Meat Offal, Onions,
Plastic Sheeting, and Sleds and Toys were impairing their export, and
thus, were prima facie illegal.
With respect to the NAUK Conference's General Cargo, N.O.S.
rate, the evidentiary prerequisites for the second leg of the rate dis-
parities rule were substantially watered down. The Commission did not
point to specific evidence in the record nor find explicitly that the
N.O.S. rate inhibited or impaired exports of the several hundred
commodities moving annually under it, but only that, because it was
"so high" ($70.75 per ton W/M), "it has a tendency" to do so. 214 There
were two or three isolated instances cited in which shippers allegedly
had difficulty exporting under the General Cargo rate, but it was not
upon such evidence that the Commission principally relied. Instead, the
Commission bottomed its finding that the $70.75 General Cargo rate
had a "tendency to inhibit exports" upon the proposition that the
General Cargo, N.O.S. rate is "merely a starting point for bargain-
ing"215 over cargo classification and rate levels, and that at so high a
level it had had a harmful impact on the bargaining position of export-
ers vis--vis the conference. The examiner's findings on this point were
that:
The record establishes that the high NAUK general cargo
rate places the onus on a prospective shipper whose com-
modity is not listed in the conference tariff to demonstrate
that the commodity rate should be lower than the N.O.S. rate.
The shipper is in an unfavorable position to justify a partic-
213 Id.
214 Id. at 88.
215 While this was the language of the presiding examiner, Init. Dec., supra note 194,
at 49, it aptly characterizes the Commission's more prolix views on the nature of the
General Cargo, N.O.S. rate.
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ular rate, as compared to the conference, because the business
of the conference is setting rates. If the N.O.S. rate were in an
amount approximately equal to the average rate in the entire
tariff, the instances of this inequitable burden being placed
on the shipper would decrease substantially.
... The expert testimony also demonstrated that it is psy-
chologically forbidding and disturbing for shippers, partic-
ularly small shippers, to try to convince a shipping conference
that $70.75 N.O.S. rate should be, say, a $40 commodity rate.
Rather than undertake this burden, they often simply decide
against exporting the commodity.216
The Commission accepted this reasoning in full and incorporated the
examiner's language in haec verbis, changing only the italicized portion
to read: "The shipper is usually in a unfavorable position to justify
a particular rate, as compared to the conference, because of lack of
economic pressure and lack of experience."217
It should be noted here that there is no visible support in the
examiner's findings or in the record for this new characterization of the
exporter's bargaining disadvantage; rather there is much in both which
renders it of very questionable accuracy.218 Yet, the foregoing "evi-
dence" was held sufficient to support a finding that the outbound
General Cargo, N.O.S. rate impaired exports.
Having thus established that the higher NAUK rate inhibited or
had a tendency to inhibit exports in each case, the Commission held
that these NAUK rates were prima facie illegal; that under the Com-
mission's rate disparities rules the NAUK Conference was therefore
obliged to justify them; and, finally, that in view of the carriers' refusal
to submit "appropriate data," the examiner quite properly ruled that
"rates which appear to be unreasonable by virtue of their comparison
with other rates were in fact unreasonable because of lack of proof to
the contrary."219
216 Id. at 49-50 (italics supplied).
217 NAUK Investigation at 17 (italics supplied).
218 E.g., the examiner found that in 1966 the NAUK Conference received 174 requests
for rate adjustments from shippers and granted 140 or 80.4%, a considerably greater
percentage than did NAWFA of its total shipper requests. See Init. Dec., supra note 194,
at 20. The great majority of these were requests by shippers of very small tonnages for
specific commodity classifications at rates lower than General Cargo, N.O.S. The examiner
gave an example of such a case, wherein a shipper of very small tonnages of aquariums
under the N.OS. rate of $70.75 was given a 50% reduction to $35.50 W/M. Id. at 76.
Moreover the Commission's statement amply demonstrates the inability of the Commission
to grapple with the ratemaking process as a whole, that is, to comprehend its fundamental
dynamic, for it is on the basis of "economic pressure" that all rates are set.
219 NAUK Investigation at 33.
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The presiding examiner's proposed remedy was that the Commission
fix new "reasonable rates." For General Cargo, N.O.S., this rate was
to be roughly equal to the average rate in the NAUK Conference tariff;
for the six specific commodities, the Conference was ordered to file
new rates no higher than those prevailing either in the inbound trade,
or in the nearby competitive trade, whichever had been used as the
standard of reference under the rate disparities rule. This was an
extraordinary and unprecedented remedy, assuming for the Com-
mission a rate-fixing power which it never before thought it pos-
sessed2 0 and which Congress quite clearly denied it.221 The Com-
mission rejected the examiner's remedial proposals, but deliberately
left open the question of whether it possessed the power to fix rates in
the United States foreign liner trades. It merely disapproved the seven
rates in issue under section 18(b)(5) and ordered the NAUK Conference
to "file lower rates ... with a justification of the level of the new rate,
based upon cost, value of service, or other transportation conditions. '222
Here the matter now rests, while the NAUK Conference seeks review in
the United States court of appeals.
220 The Commission's traditional view of its powers was summarized by Chairman
Harllee in Hearing on Refunding of Freight Charges Before the Subcomm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Commerce Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. no.
90-56 (1967).
Although section 18(b)(5) of the Shipping Act, 1916, gives to the Commission
authority to disapprove any rate "filed by a common carrier by water in the for-
eign commerce of the United States," which it finds to be "so unreasonably high"
as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States, nowhere in the Ship-
ping Act is the Commission given the power to fix a "reasonable rate" in the
foreign trade.
221 Illustrative of the clarity of congressional intent on this score is the language of
the Senate Commerce Committee Report on the Bonner amendments, S. REP. No. 860,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3132 (1961), reported in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3132. Even
the Douglas Committee did not favor empowering the FMC to fix reasonable rates in
the foreign trades. 1966 DouotLAs ComiarrEE REPORT 20.
222 NAUK Investigation at 42-43.
